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The emotional experience of individuals who experience psychosis has to a large
extent been neglected, possibly in part due to the historical divide between the
psychoses and neuroses. However recent research would suggest that individuals
who experience psychosis experience emotional dysfunction to a similar extent as
those with other mental health problems. The relatively new field of emotion
regulation may provide insight into emotional dysfunction in psychosis and therefore
the aim of this thesis is to better understand emotional experience and regulation in
psychosis in comparison with other mental health problems and healthy volunteers.
Design
This study used a between-groups design and was based on an opportunity sample of
patients attending clinical psychology departments.
Methods
Three groups of participants were recruited for this study comprising of 21
individuals who had experienced psychosis, 21 individuals with an anxiety/mood
disorder and 21 healthy volunteers. The participants completed 2 measures of
emotion regulation: the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) and the Emotion
Regulation Questionnaire-2 (ERQ-2); a measure of emotional experience: the Basic
Emotions Scale and a measure of coping strategies: the BriefCOPE.
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Results
The clinical groups were found to utilise similar emotion regulation strategies and in
comparison to healthy volunteers they used significantly more dysfunctional and less
functional strategies. The clinical groups were found to experience similar levels of
emotions and in comparison to healthy volunteers they experienced greater levels of
negatively valenced emotions and lower levels of happiness. The clinical groups
were also found to use greater amounts of maladaptive coping strategies and lesser
amounts of problem-focussed coping strategies than the healthy volunteers.
Conclusions
Overall it appears that emotional experience and regulation in psychosis may be
more similar to neuroses than originally was believed to be the case. This would
suggest therefore that theories of psychosis should take into consideration emotional
dysfunction. Difficulties with emotion regulation should be considered as potential
contributory factors in the development, maintenance and course of psychosis.
Further research is required in order to validate the findings of this study and to
further develop theories of emotion regulation in psychosis.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Overview
The emotional experience of individuals who have experienced psychosis has been a
neglected area of research (Birchwood, 2003). As will be demonstrated this is likely
due to the historical divide between the neuroses and psychoses. Current
psychological models of psychosis will be reviewed followed by a review of relevant
research relating to emotional experience in psychosis. This review will demonstrate
the grounds for investigating emotional experiences in psychosis. Emotion regulation
theories and models will be outlined and considered in relation to psychosis. The
broader concept of coping in psychosis will also be reviewed in relation to emotional
functioning. The aims and rationale for the study will then be laid out with specific
research hypotheses.
1.2. History of schizophrenia
The development of early understandings of schizophrenia can be traced back to the
psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin working in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In the
medical tradition of attempting to classify disorders, Kraepelin identified a number
of behaviours (symptoms) which he identified as occurring together and named the
disorder 'dementia praecox', literally meaning unusually early mental deterioration.
The symptoms he highlighted as most common in this disorder were hallucinations,
delusions, thought disorder and flattened affect. Dementia praecox was distinguished
from organic psychoses, such as Alzheimer's disease, as there was no identifiable
characteristic neuropathology. Elowever it was considered as distinct from the
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neuroses resulting from the implicit assumption that neurotic disorders have
psychological aetiology while psychotic disorders have organic aetiology (Freeman
and Garety, 2003).
Following on from Kraepelin's work Eugen Bleuler coined the term schizophrenia,
literally meaning 'split mind' to expand Kraepelin's understanding of dementia
praecox to include paraphrenia (pronounced delusions and hallucinations without
marked intellectual deterioration) and paranoia. Bleuler's classification attempted to
take into account the underlying psychological processes that may account for the
disorder and placed considerable emphasis on the role of affect. Bleuler considered
that at the heart of schizophrenia was a loosening of associations which linked
thoughts together accompanied by the experience of ambivalent and conflicting
emotions and attitudes, social withdrawal and dominance of fantasy and the
experience of inappropriate or incongruent affect (Bentall, 2003). Bleuler proposed
that hallucinations and delusions were accessory features of schizophrenia.
In the early 1960's Karl Jaspers took a different approach to the understanding of
schizophrenia. He used a phenomenological approach in which the clinician's
inability to understand or empathise with the patient's experiences was what
differentiated schizophrenic symptoms (Lavender, 2000). In a similar vein
Schneider's (1959) first rank symptoms of schizophrenia were phenomena which
were not understandable, such as hearing one's thought spoken aloud or holding a
conviction that external forces are interfering with bodily functions.
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More recently symptoms of schizophrenia have been categorised as positive
(functional distortions or excesses) and negative (deficits). Positive symptoms
include hallucinations, delusions, thought disorder and disorganised behaviour while
negative symptoms include apathy, blunted affect, withdrawal and poverty of speech
(Wing, 1989). These categories have been incorporated into the current diagnostic
systems and the presence of positive symptoms has, for many clinicians, become a
significant indication that an individual is experiencing a psychotic episode and
should therefore be given a related diagnosis (e.g. schizophrenia).
At the heart of the current diagnostic systems, the fourth edition (text revision) of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric Association,
2000) and the tenth edition of the International Classification of Mental and
Behavioural Disorders (ICD-10, World Health Organisation, 1992), there remains a
strong Kraepelinian influence (Bentall, 2003). These systems provide lists of similar
signs and symptoms required for the diagnosis of a number of types or subtypes of
psychotic disorders. They also provide inclusion and exclusion criteria for
diagnosing schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders.
There is a significant difference in these systems as to how long an individual has to
have experienced certain symptoms to receive a diagnosis. For example, in the ICD-
10 (World Health Organisation, 1992) an individual should have experienced
delusions or hallucinations for 1 month minimum, while the DSM-IV-TR (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000) requires that the individual should have experienced
these for a minimum of 6 months to receive a diagnosis of schizophrenia. This lack
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of consensus between the two systems highlights the difficulty with the reliable
diagnosis of schizophrenia (Read, 2004a).
1.2.1 Reliability and validity of schizophrenia
Given the differences in classification systems it is pertinent to consider the
reliability and validity of schizophrenia as a diagnostic entity. In relation to
reliability, Read (2004a), after reviewing a number of reliability studies, concluded
that 'the category remains disjunctive today' (Read, 2004a: 46) given that the
majority of studies reviewed reported a wide variety of reliability rates between
clinicians.
Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim (1988) suggest that there are three main conditions that
should be fulfilled for schizophrenia to be considered a valid concept: firstly that the
symptoms should occur together but not in other disorders, secondly that from
diagnosis it should be possible to predict onset, outcome and response to treatment
and lastly that diagnosis should be related to aetiology.
In relation to the first condition that symptoms should occur together and not in other
disorders a number of studies have found that schizophrenic symptoms can often be
identified in individuals with other diagnoses e.g. bipolar disorder (Crow, 1990),
dissociative identity disorder (Ellason and Ross, 1995) and mania (Warner, 1994). In
addition, Kendler, Gallagher, Abelson and Kessler (1996) found that individuals
diagnosed with non-affective psychoses had a lifetime prevalence of 73.4% for mood
disorders and of 71.4% for anxiety disorders.
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The second condition that diagnosis should predict onset, outcome and response to
treatment has also not been fulfilled. Kraepelin believed the disorder to have an
early, continuous and deteriorating course, although more recent evidence has
suggested that the onset can be acute or insidious, that the course can be episodic or
continuous and that the prognosis can be favourable with up to one quarter of those
diagnosed with schizophrenia showing full recovery (Ciompi, 1980). Read (2004a)
suggests that psycho-social factors such as work performance, social skills and
family tolerance are far superior at predicting prognosis in individuals diagnosed
with schizophrenia. In relation to aetiology there is no clear relationship between
diagnosis and the cause of schizophrenia. Numerous studies have attempted to find
an underlying cause but as yet there is no overall agreement on aetiology (Lavender,
2000; Read, 2004b).
The stability of schizophrenic diagnosis has also been called into question. Chen,
Swann and Burt (1996) reviewed the case files of 936 individuals diagnosed with
schizophrenia who had been admitted to a psychiatric hospital on at least four
occasions during the study period. They found that over 20% of individuals
diagnosed with schizophrenia received a different diagnosis (such as schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar disorder, or unipolar disorder) on subsequent admissions. Females
and Hispanics were most likely to receive a change in diagnosis from schizophrenia
to another disorder while African Americans were most likely to receive a change in
diagnosis from another disorder to schizophrenia. This study suggests that
demographic and socio-economic factors may play a role in diagnostic instability.
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It can be seen that there are a number of difficulties with the reliability and validity
of the concept of schizophrenia, the diagnosis also carries with it negative
connotations and implications that individuals (diagnosed with schizophrenia) have
some as yet unidentified brain disorder. Therefore a number of researchers and
clinicians have suggested that it is more appropriate to study the symptoms and
experiences of individuals as opposed to the syndrome of schizophrenia (Bannister,
1968; Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim, 1988 and Costello, 1993). Some suggest instead
using a less stigmatising term such as psychosis (Harrop and Trower, 2003) which
would also include individuals who experience difficulties that would be diagnosed
as bipolar, schizoaffective and related disorders.
The present thesis seeks to study as broad a sample as possible whilst imposing the
minimum amount of diagnostic criteria for inclusion in this study, especially given
the limited research in this area. Thus for the purposes of this thesis the term
psychosis includes diagnoses such as schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder,
affective psychosis, non-affective psychosis and bipolar disorder. Therefore while
participants in the psychosis group will all have experienced some psychotic
phenomena their diagnoses may vary.
1.3. Psychosis
1.3.1. Psychosis: categorical entity or continuum?
Psychosis has historically been considered as a categorical entity (Beer, 1996)
however more recently research has been carried out to determine whether a
continuum model could add to a better understanding ofpsychotic phenomena.
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Johns, Cannon, Singleton, Murray, Farrell, Brugha, Bebbington, Jenkins and Meltzer
(2004) carried out a study to look at the prevalence rates of self-reported psychotic
symptoms in the British population. They surveyed 8580 people and found 5.5% of
individuals endorsed items on the Psychosis Screening Questionnaire (PSQ).
Although this study found lower rates of self-reported psychotic phenomena than
previous studies (e.g. Kendler, Gallagher, Abelson and Kessler, 1996) one important
finding was that individuals who endorsed one or more items on the PSQ had
demographic and clinical correlates similar to those experiencing clinical psychosis,
such as recent stressful life events, victimisation and alcohol and cannabis
dependence. This finding is consistent with a continuum model of psychosis.
Stefanis, Hanssen, Smirnis, Avramopoulos, Evdokimidis, Stenfanis, Verdoux and
van Os (2002) also carried out a study investigating psychotic experiences in the
general population. They found evidence for a continuum model of psychosis and
further found evidence that the frequency of symptoms was associated with higher
distress. Their study also supported their idea that the experience of depression
accompanies psychotic experiences in the general population and they proposed that
this could be due to a sharing of aetiological factors.
In relation to aetiological factors, Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam and van Os (2003),
reviewed a number of studies related to the experience of psychotic symptoms in the
general population. They found evidence that aetiological factors related to clinical
psychosis were also found in individuals in the general population who had
psychosis-like experiences. For example, men were more likely to display negative
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symptoms, the age of experience of psychotic-like symptoms was younger in men,
experiences of discrimination, trauma and urban living were higher in individuals
who had experienced psychotic-like symptoms, cannabis use was associated with
higher levels of psychotic-like experiences and personality traits (such as
neuroticism) were also found to be higher in individuals in the general population
who reported psychotic-like experiences. They concluded from their review that
there was good evidence that psychosis exists as a continuum in the general
population.
Hallucinations and delusions have also been reported by individuals experiencing
conditions of extreme sensory deprivation, (Leff, 1968) sleep deprivation (Babkoff,
Sing, Thorne, Genser and Hegge, 1989) and bereavement (Grimby, 1993).
It would appear therefore that it may be preferable to characterise psychotic
experiences as lying on a continuum from psychotic-like experiences to psychotic
disorders as opposed to a dichotomy between normal and abnormal. As with mood
and anxiety disorders clinical levels of psychosis may be reached once the symptoms
significantly interfere with the individual's functioning.
1.4. Psychological theories of psychosis
Recently there has been growing interest in attempting to understand the symptoms
of psychosis from a psychological perspective (e.g. Garety, Kuipers, Fowler,
Freeman, and Bebbington, 2001; Hingley, 1997a,b; Morrison, 1998, Chadwick and
Birchwood 1994). These approaches have focussed on an attempt to understand and
Karen Livingstone 13 D.Clin.Psychol
explain specific experiences/behaviours of individuals who experience psychosis.
Although it is beyond the remit of this thesis to provide a comprehensive review of
every psychological theory of psychosis it is useful to briefly summarise the most
influential accounts that are ofparticular relevance to this study.
1.4.1. Neuropsychological theories
Neuropsychological models are based on the assumption that the brain works in a
similar fashion to a computer with regard to how it processes information (e.g. Frith,
1992). They integrate neurological and cognitive explanations of psychosis in an
attempt to explain how cognitive impairment, resulting from neurological damage,
may give rise to psychotic experiences.
It has been suggested that the symptoms of schizophrenia may result from disrupted
self awareness. Frith (1992) proposed that auditory hallucinations may result from
the misattribution of internal events to an external source. Frith (1992) cites evidence
of auditory hallucinations being accompanied by covert movements of the speech
musculature, which accompanies inner speech. It could be postulated that other
forms of hallucinations, such as visual hallucinations, may also be due to
misattribution of, for example, mental imagery. One possible explanation for this
misattribution could be a neurologically based deficit in the mechanisms responsible
for internal monitoring (Frith, 1992). Specifically it is suggested that dysfunction in
the neural pathways between the septohippocampal system and the prefrontal cortex,
as well as dopamine dysregulation in these areas of the brain, may be related to the
disruption of consciousness. More research would be required in this area in order to
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determine the source of the neuropsychological deficit and to discover why these
mechanisms are functioning differently in individuals who experience psychosis.
A similar model, related to self monitoring, has been proposed by Hemsley (1996).
According to this model there is a disturbance in the processing of current
perception, such that stored memories are not fully integrated with current sensory
input, resulting in information not being integrated within temporal and spatial
context. This lack of integration is proposed to lead to individuals experiencing non-
relevant features of their environment as personally relevant while thoughts and
memories which are irrelevant to the current situation are assessed, perceived as alien
and attributed to an external source, as opposed to being experienced as self
generated (for example, the mind wandering). This dysfunction in monitoring can
therefore lead to individuals experiencing symptoms such as hallucination and
delusions of reference, as they either experience non-relevant stimuli as relevant or
their own thoughts and memories as having come from external sources.
It can be seen that the neuropsychological models discussed above highlight one
particular deficit which is proposed to be fundamentally responsible for the
manifestation of psychotic symptoms resulting from deficits in information
processing. However the resulting hypothetical models of neurological pathways
which have been proposed await empirical verification.
A different approach than that of building unifying theories, has been of studying
specific psychotic symptoms (e.g. Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim, 1988). This
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approach has lead to the development of cognitive models of psychotic symptoms.
1.4.2. Cognitive theories
Cognitive models ofpsychosis come from the standpoint that psychotic symptoms do
not necessarily reflect the presence of an underlying disorder rather that they lie on a
continuum with normal experiences. These models offer specific explanations for
individual symptoms and propose therapeutic approaches for these (e.g. Morrison,
2002). The majority of cognitive models of psychosis focus on positive symptoms,
specifically hallucinations and delusions.
Bentall (1990) suggests that hallucinations may represent cognitive biases (as
opposed to deficits proposed by neuropsychological models e.g. Frith, 1992). It is
proposed that individuals who experience psychosis misattribute internal stimuli to
an external source and that their beliefs about what kinds of events are likely to occur
may increase their likelihood ofmisattributing internal stimuli. Bentall (1990) argues
that this process could explain why cultural differences are apparent in the
experience of hallucinations as different cultures hold different beliefs about
hallucinatory experiences. He further suggests that this bias is reinforced by a
reduction in anxiety which occurs due to the misattribution of particular types of
internal events (especially negative thoughts about the self) as externally generated.
Morrison, Haddock and Tarrier (1995) argue that misattributions can account for
both the negative and positive emotional content of auditory hallucinations related to
whether the individual has underlying positive or negative schema about themselves
(i.e. the auditory hallucinations are congruent with their underlying schemata).
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Chadwick and Birchwood (1994) further develop ideas about the roles of beliefs in
psychotic experiences. They highlight the findings that individuals vary with regard
to whether they experience hallucinations as distressing and frightening or as
reassuring or amusing. Chadwick and Birchwood (1994) suggest that the degree of
distress created by the experience of hallucinations is mediated by the individual's
beliefs about the voices' power and authority. This model is informed by Beck et al's
cognitive model of depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw and Emery, 1979) in which
individual's symptoms are consequences of their beliefs as opposed to situational
antecedents. Birchwood, Meaden, Trower, Gilbert and Plaistow (2004) later
expanded this understanding to include individual's beliefs about their social
ranking. The proposal is that individuals who perceive themselves as ranking lower
than their voice (as a result of past and current interpersonal relationships) will be
more distressed by their experiences.
Morrison (1998) offers an understanding of hallucinations based on Clark's (1986)
model of panic disorder. Morrison starts by considering that auditory hallucinations
can be considered to be normal phenomena, given the reports in the general
population (discussed earlier). As with Clark's (1986) panic model and Beck et al.'s
(1979) depression model, it is the interpretation/appraisal of the auditory
hallucinations (as threatening physical or psychological integrity) which determines
an individual's reaction to them and resulting distress. Morrison's (1998) model
proposes that misinterpretation of an internal or external trigger giving rise to an
auditory hallucination leads to an increase in negative mood and physiological
arousal, the individual then engages in safety seeking behaviours, such as
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hypervigilance, which maintains the misinterpretations. The increased levels of
arousal may make misinterpretations of ambiguous stimuli more likely. While this
model does not offer an explanation as to the development of auditory hallucinations,
other than them being normal experiences, it could be combined with others, such as
Frith's (1992) neuropsychological deficit theory outlined above.
Slade and Bentall (1988) also consider misattributions as key to hallucinatory
experiences and suggest five factors implicated in the occurrence ofhallucinations:
• Stress induced arousal
• Predisposing factors (especially a deficit in reality testing)
• External stimulation (deprivation or over stimulation)
• Reinforcement (anxiety reducing)
• Expectations (cultural beliefs)
It is the combination of these factors that Slade and Bentall (1988) propose lead to
individuals experiencing internal events as external stimuli. This model is useful as it
explicitly integrates a number of factors outlined in other models (such as
reinforcement and neuropsychological deficits). However it remains unclear which
factors lead to each other and as with Frith's (1992) model the reasons why
individuals would have a deficit in reality testing are not well understood.
Delusions were traditionally assumed to be uninformative 'empty' speech acts
(Bentall, 2004) although more recently psychologists have been attempting to gain a
better understanding of their maintenance and development. The most common
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forms of delusions are persecutory/paranoid, negative beliefs about the self or
grandiose beliefs (Bentall, 2004). Current cognitive theories attempt to explain
delusions as developing from the same processes as non-delusional beliefs.
Maher (1974) suggested that individuals who experienced delusions were using
normal reasoning processes to make sense of anomalous experiences. The delusions
may then be maintained by processes such as 'self-fulfilling prophecy', seen in non-
delusional individuals, whereby the outcome is in line with the individuals
expectations due to them behaving in a way which makes their expected outcome
more likely. Maher (1974) does not however explain why certain individuals would
be more likely to experience anomalous experiences.
Garety and Hemsley (1994) suggested that delusions may result from reasoning
biases whereby individuals make greater use of current information than past
learning and are over reliant on expectations in novel situations. It is suggested that
the reliance on current information is implicated in the formation of delusions while
the over reliance on expectations maintains delusions by increasing attendance to
information which confirms the delusional explanation. Evidence for this proposal
comes from studies investigating hypothesis testing.
Dudley, John, Young and Over (1997) investigated reasoning biases in hypothesis
testing in individuals who had experienced delusions. In this study they found that
individuals who had experienced delusions were more likely to jump to conclusions
based on limited information. They also found that when given sufficient information
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individuals who had experienced psychosis were equally as good at making
predictions as depressed individuals and healthy controls. They concluded therefore
that delusional thinking in psychosis was related to data-gathering bias as opposed to
deficits in their reasoning ability and suggest that this may be functional in that it
reduces cognitive demands of a task. One important factor to note is that when
presented with disconfirmatory evidence the individuals who had experienced
delusions were equally willing to change their conclusions, this is inconsistent with
traditional views that delusional individuals are resistant to counter-evidence to their
beliefs and highlights the need for better explanations of how reasoning biases
actually lead to delusional experiences. While this theory goes some way to
explaining how delusions beliefs may develop it does not explain their maintenance
in the face of disconfirmatory evidence.
Freeman, Garety, Fowler, Kuipers, Bebbington, and Dunn (2004) suggest that
individuals who experience delusions do not choose more realistic explanations
perhaps because they are unaware that there are other explanations possible for their
experiences. They consider that in the case of internal experiences a lack of
awareness and knowledge of these leads to the generation of externalised delusional
explanations. They also suggest that alternative explanations need to be as
compelling as the delusional explanation for the individuals, in order for them to
consider them as feasible.
Freeman, Garety and Kuipers (2001) propose an explanation of the maintenance of
delusional beliefs. To do this they focus on why individuals who experience
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delusions discard disconfirmatory evidence. They suggest that as with anxiety
disorders (Salkovskis, 1991) individuals who experience delusions may be utilising
safety seeking behaviours which prevent disconfirmation of their threat beliefs. In
their study they found evidence that all the individuals in their study who
experienced persecutory delusions reported safety behaviours and that they believed
these behaviours had a degree of success. They note however that while their
findings support their model of safety behaviours maintaining delusions, that there
are likely to be other factors in the maintenance of delusions, such as experiences
being accommodated into the delusional framework.
Bentall (2004) proposes that delusions may be related to self-serving attributional
biases. This model stems from the belief that in order to make sense of the world
around us we generate causal explanations for events. Most people exhibit a self
serving bias in that they tend to make internal attributions for positive events and
external attributions for negative ones. It is suggested that individuals with delusions
display an exaggerated self-serving bias. This model makes intuitive sense as it
would imply that the more negative events experienced as externally caused, the
increasing likelihood of paranoia. Garety and Freeman (1999) point out however that
while paranoid delusions appear to function to preserve self-esteem, individuals who
experience paranoid delusions often have low self-esteem. This paradox could occur
due to feelings of entrapment in relation to the delusions (discussed more fully in
section 1.5.3.)
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In the cognitive models reviewed above it can be seen that many of them discuss the
importance of emotion/distress in the development or maintenance of psychosis. For
example Bentall (1990) proposes that misattributions of internal experiences to
external stimuli can serve to reduce anxiety, while other models identify safety
seeking behaviours, which serve to reduce anxiety, as important in the maintenance
of psychotic symptoms. Cognitive models of psychosis focus much of their attention
on the appraisals made by individuals who experience psychosis and tend to view
these as key to the development and maintenance of their difficulties.
1.4.3. Psvchodvnamic theories
Psychodynamic theories of psychosis can be traced back to Freud's unitary approach
in which the basis for neurotic disorders (e.g. intra-psychic conflict and defence
mechanisms) also applied to psychosis (Hingley, 1997a). Even though Freud
considered the basis of psychosis and neurosis to be similar, he developed the view
that those who experienced psychosis could not be involved in analytic work as they
were unable to establish a close therapeutic alliance and thus a transference
relationship could not be formed (Silver, Koehler, and Karon, 2004). Other
psychoanalysts, such as Jung (1937), Fromm-Reichmann (1950) and Cullberg
(1991), however disagreed with this view and adapted psychoanalytic techniques in
order to develop therapeutic alliances with those who had experienced psychosis.
This form of therapy was based on the assumption that individuals who experienced
psychosis had fragile Egos which were defended by regression to early childhood
forms of communication. The focus of therapy was therefore on gradual
development ofmore mature/adult forms of communication.
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Psychodynamic theories propose that interactions between a baby and its caregiver
are crucial to the development of sense of self (Winnicott, 1960), the ability to
manage internal and external experiences (Bion, 1962) and to distinguish between
them. The ability of the caregiver to help the baby manage its anxieties is viewed as
paramount (Klein, 1946/86). If there are inadequacies in this relationship these may
lead to the development of a fragile Ego characterised by insecure sense of self,
insecure boundaries between the self and others and difficulties with relating to
others. Frosch (1983) and Klein (1946/86) propose that when anxieties are not made
bearable the infant 'splits off these emotions and projects them onto the external
world, leading to a distorted reality. Frosch (1983) suggests that in essence psychosis
reflects an incapacity to reality test and to distinguish between the internal and
external world. Psychoanalysts propose that when an individual, who has developed
a fragile sense of self, feels threatened they will respond using a pattern of childhood
defence mechanisms such as splitting off, projection, denial and distortion, it is this
defence pattern, characteristic of early childhood, which is viewed as responsible for
psychotic experiences such as hallucinations and delusions.
Psychotic experiences are therefore viewed as likely to occur at times of emotional
difficulty during which the vulnerable individual 'splits off overwhelming negative
emotions and projects them onto an external source in order to protect the Ego from
underlying negative feelings (e.g. anxiety). This external source is then viewed as
'bad' or persecutory. This distortion in perception and realty testing is therefore a
product of an interaction between a vulnerable Ego and the use of childhood defence
mechanisms. Robbins (1993) noted that psychoanalysts do not deny the role genetics
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may play in the development of psychosis and suggested that vulnerability to
immature defence mechanisms may result from an interaction between genetics and
inadequate parenting.
Much of psychoanalytic understanding of psychosis is derived from clinical
experience through intense, prolonged therapeutic contact. This has allowed
psychoanalysts to gain a significant depth of understanding of individuals' personal
vulnerabilities, defence mechanisms and meaning of psychotic phenomena. A
possible weakness is the extent to which individual findings can be generalised to
others (Lavender, 2000).
Despite contrasting views on the validity and efficacy of psychodynamic approaches
to psychosis (Hingley, 1997a; Mueser and Berenbaum, 1990) some psychodynamic
concepts have received support from researchers in cognitive theories. Some of the
cognitive theories of psychosis outlined above can be seen to be closely related to
psychodynamic theories. For example, Bentall's (2004) proposal that external
attributions for internal events serve to reduce anxiety can be viewed as a defence
mechanism (projection) in psychodynamic terms (Hingley, 1997a). The finding that
individuals who experience psychosis are more likely to jump to conclusions
(Dudley, John, Young and Over, 1997) may reflect Frosch's (1983) ideas about
disturbed reality testing.
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1.4.4. Summary and integration
It can be seen that many of the psychological theories of psychosis involve
consideration of the role emotions may play in the development and maintenance of
psychotic phenomena, although emotional experience in psychosis as a whole has
been a somewhat neglected area of research. Cognitive theories and psychodynamic
theories appear to share similar ideas about psychosis, such as reduction of anxiety,
although they are described using different terms. The neuropsychological theory of
lack on internal monitoring (Frith, 1992) may relate to emotional disturbance in that
individuals who experience psychosis may experience overwhelming emotions
without a clear explanation about where they came from, as a result of an internal
monitoring deficit. Given the possible role of emotions in psychotic experiences it
seems imperative to consider the emotional experience of individuals who
experience psychosis.
1.5. Emotional functioning and psychosis
1.5.1. Historical background
The study of emotions in psychosis has historically been a neglected area, this is
likely to be related to the Kraepelinian divide between neuroses and psychoses
described earlier (Birchwood, 2003). This lack of acknowledgement of the
importance of emotional functioning in psychosis is reflected by the lack of emphasis
in the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, which attend to emotional functioning on
a somewhat superficial level describing emotional experience as blunted, often
involving a restricted capacity to experience pleasurable emotions (DSM-IV-TR,
American Psychiatric Association 2000, ICD-10, World Health Organisation 1992).
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While Bleuler's understanding of schizophrenia placed significant emphasis on
affective disturbance, theory, research and practice can be seen to be substantially
influenced by the Kraepelinian approach (Bentall, 2003), where psychosis is
understood as a primarily cognitive disorder, manifested by disturbances in thinking,
as opposed to a primarily affective disorder, such as mania (Ciompi, 1998).
It may be appropriate to ask therefore why emotions should be studied in relation to
psychosis. It could be argued that if there is an emotional disturbance present it is
more than likely that it may have an influence on psychosis (Freeman and Garety,
2003) and that a greater understanding of emotional dysfunction in psychosis could
in turn lead to a greater understanding of emotional factors as a contributory factor in
the development and maintenance ofpsychosis (Strauss, 1989).
1.5.2. Emotional experience in psychosis
Suslow, Roestel, Ohrmann and Arolt (2003) investigated the experience of emotions
in individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. They found that regardless of
whether the patients were diagnosed with or without affective symptoms they
reported feeling negative emotions, such as fear, disgust, anger, guilt and shame,
more often than a healthy control group. This study found a full range of positive and
negative emotional experiences in individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Van
Os, Gilvarry, Bale, van Horn, Tatten, White and Murray (2000) also found high rates
of affective symptoms in patients diagnosed with affective and non-affective
psychosis suggesting that overlap between these diagnoses may be common.
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In relation to the period prior to diagnosis (prodromal phase) there is a consensus that
the majority of individuals experience symptoms of anxiety, depression and
irritability up to four weeks prior to the appearance of positive psychotic symptoms
(Freeman and Garety, 2003). In Docherty, van Kammen, Siris and Marder's (1978)
description of the stages of onset of psychosis there appears to be a range of
emotions experienced by individuals, such as anxiety and irritability; a sense of being
overwhelmed; depression; apathy; hopelessness and disinhibition (with possible
elevation in mood). These findings of mood disturbance prior to positive psychotic
symptoms may suggest there is an interaction between emotion dysfunction and
psychotic symptoms.
With regard to anxiety disorders accompanying psychosis, Cosoff and Hafner (1998)
found high rates of comorbid anxiety in schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder and
bipolar disorder. They found the proportion of individuals with an anxiety disorder
(43-45%) was almost identical across the three diagnostic groups. They also found
that in half of these cases the anxiety disorder appeared to predate the onset of
psychosis by 2-5 years. They propose that this highlights the need for better
identification of comorbid anxiety disorders in psychosis in order to offer possible
treatments for anxiety alongside treatment for psychosis. Given these findings of
anxiety preceding the onset psychosis it could be suggested that anxiety plays a
causal role in the development of psychotic phenomena rather than simply occurring
as a comorbid disorder. Emsley, Oosthuizen, Niehaus and Stein (2001) suggest that
there is increasing evidence that anxiety symptoms are of considerable clinical
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importance in psychosis and state that they may compromise social and vocational
functioning as well as increase the risks of relapse and suicide.
Brockington, Kendel and Wainwright (1980) suggest that up to 10% of all psychotic
admissions may be accounted for by a combination of depression and positive
psychotic symptoms. In their study they noted that in nearly one third of their sample
they could not agree on a final diagnosis again highlighting the difficulties inherent
in the classification systems, especially in relation to emotional disturbances in
psychosis. Johnson (1988) found high rates of depression (65%) in individuals
diagnosed with schizophrenia who had recently recovered from an acute episode of
psychosis. It is also of note that in this sample over half the patients experienced
depressive symptoms prior to an acute relapse of their psychosis perhaps suggesting
that emotional disturbance was implicated in their relapse.
A further study which investigated depression and anxiety in schizophrenia was
carried out by Norman, Malla, Cortese and Diaz (1998). Their results showed that
anxiety and depression were substantially interrelated. However when they
controlled for anxiety scores they found depression to be more strongly related to
negative than positive symptoms and when they controlled for depression scores they
found anxiety to be more strongly related to reality distortion than negative
symptoms. This study provides further preliminary evidence that emotional
disturbance may be related to the onset or course of symptoms ofpsychosis.
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Overall it can be seen that there is a high frequency of affective disorders, such as
anxiety and depression, in individuals who have experienced psychosis. These
disturbances can be seen prior to the development of psychosis (Freeman and Garety,
2003) and are also implicated, in relation to stressful life events, in relapse (Neale,
Blanchard, Kerr, Kring and Smith, 1998).
An example of the relationship between affective disturbance and the course of
psychotic illness comes from studies of expressed emotion within the family. A
number of studies have found high levels of expressed emotion in key relatives,
defined as criticism, hostility and emotional over-involvement, to be significantly
related to relapse (Neale, Blanchard, Kerr, Kring and Smith, 1998). In order to
explain the mechanism by which high levels of expressed emotion relate to relapse
Buck, Goldman, Easton and Norelli Smith (1998) suggest that individuals who
experience psychosis may be highly sensitive to the negative emotional expressions
of others and that this may exacerbate their symptoms by increasing their own levels
of negative emotions and decreasing the experience ofpositive emotions.
Anhedonia (reduced capacity to experience pleasure) has been found, using self-
report and clinical assessments, to be a relatively stable trait in psychosis (Blanchard,
1998). Anhedonia has been found to be related not only to reduced experience of
positive emotions but also to increased experience of negative emotions (Blanchard,
1998). Several studies have compared individuals who have experienced psychosis
with individuals with an affective disorder and have found similar levels of
anhedonia (Blanchard, 1998). The mechanisms underlying anhedonia are unclear.
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Blanchard (1998) suggests that anhedonia could result from an inability to
experience positive emotions due to some form of deficit or could reflect changes in
the individual's behaviour such that they are less likely to take part in activities
which may generate positive emotions. This change in behaviour may result from the
individuals' attempt to cope with environmental stimulation through a reduction in
interactions, with the drawback of reducing situations in which positive emotions
may be experienced.
When considering emotions in individuals with psychosis it is important to consider
the symptom of flat affect (diminished expression of emotion). Kring, Kerr, Smith
and Neale (1993) carried out a study to assess flat affect from facial expression and
reported subjective experience in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia. They
used a research paradigm where observer ratings of expressive behaviour were
compared with self reports of emotional experience when watching emotionally
arousing film clips. It was found that individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia were
observed to show fewer positive facial expressions during happy films and fewer
negative facial expressions during sad or frightening films in comparison to healthy
controls. However the self reports of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia
suggested they experienced similar (in some cases greater) levels of emotion. This
study would support the view that individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia
experience both positive and negative emotions but are disordered in their outward
expression. In a follow up study Kring and Neale (1996) included the assessment of
skin conductance to investigate the experience of emotion in individuals diagnosed
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with schizophrenia. Again they found that they did not exhibit lower emotional
reactivity when compared to healthy controls.
These findings of significant differences between emotional expression and
experience suggest that the practice of inferring blunted affect from reduced
expression is invalid. As noted above individuals with psychosis report a full range
of both positive and negative emotions (Suslow, Roestel, Ohrmann and Arolt, 2003).
Neale, Blanchard, Kerr, Kring and Smith (1998) suggest that reduced expression of
affect may in fact mask a turbulent emotional interior.
Difficulty with the expression of emotions can have significant implications in terms
of social communication (Ellgring and Smith, 1998) despite this not being a
reflection of underlying diminished emotional experience. Subtle differences in
emotional expression have been found in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia.
For example, a reduction in upper facial movements gives the impression of less
social orientation (Ellgring and Smith, 1998) while the increased displays of negative
affect prevents social interactions from serving a reassuring function and may make
interactions less pleasurable for the social partner (Ellgring and Smith, 1998).
It has been proposed that the reduced expression of emotions in individuals who
experience psychosis may reflect a need to control overwhelming sensory overload
stemming from a cognitive deficit which does not allow individuals who experience
psychosis to ignore redundant information (Ellgring and Smith, 1998). It has also
been hypothesised that the reduction in emotional expression found in some
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individuals who experience psychosis stems from attempts to protect the self from
the social partner's emotional expressions to which the individual may be especially
sensitive (Buck, Goldman, Easton, and Norelli Smith, 1998). These proposals of
coping with sensory overload can be seen to have similarities with possible
explanations for anhedonia (Blanchard, 1998) and can also be seen to be related to
Hemsley's (1996) model of distorted integration of sensory inputs and memories.
These findings suggest that emotional disturbance may play both a contributory and
maintaining role in positive symptoms of psychosis and highlight the importance of
considering emotional difficulties in relation to furthering our understanding of
psychosis.
Geekie's (2004) research, based on grounded theory, into clients' understanding of
their psychotic phenomena has identified emotional experience as an important
aspect of psychosis. Geekie (2004) used grounded theory to study his clients'
understandings of their experiences of psychosis. He found that a number of clients
identified emotional experiences as important causal factors in the development of
their psychoses. These explanations included a general concept of 'overwhelming
emotional arousal' (Geekie, 2004: 154) as well as specific emotions such as guilt,
anxiety and fear. This finding adds support from the clients' perspective that it is
important to consider the role of emotions in psychotic experiences.
Overall it can be seen that there is a great amount of emotional disturbance in
individuals who experience psychosis, ranging from anhedonia to anxiety and
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depression. Assumptions of affective blunting from reduced emotional expression
appear invalid. Given the high rates of emotional disturbance in psychosis it would
be useful to consider some possible explanations of these.
1.5.3. Psychological theories of emotions in psychosis
The historical separation of emotional and cognitive processes in psychosis can be
viewed as detrimental to our understanding of the disorder (Bentall, 2003).
Emotional disorders in psychosis are not yet well understood and resultantly few
effective treatments are available (Birchwood, 2003). The presence of emotional
dysfunction in psychosis has been found to increase the probability of early relapse
(Johnson, 1988) and also may act as a risk factor for transition to psychosis given the
high rates of emotional disturbance in the prodromal phase (Freeman and Garety,
2003). A better understanding of the role emotional dysfunction plays in psychosis
may offer the possibility of other treatment options for this at risk population.
Kring, Barrett and Gard (2003) carried out a study in order to determine whether
individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia understood/conceptualised affect in a
similar way to healthy volunteers. They examined the applicability of the affective
circumplex model of subjective emotional experiences developed with the general
population. This model is based on 2 dimensions of emotional experience: valence
(pleasure/displeasure) and arousal (for a full description of the model see Russell,
1980). The findings of this study suggest that the structure of subjective emotional
experience found in the general population can be appropriately applied as a
framework for understanding emotional functioning in schizophrenia.
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Birchwood (2003) suggests that emotional disorders in psychosis may develop as a
reaction to the psychosis itself or from developmental disturbance triggered by
childhood trauma or emerging psychosis or both. Integral to the first proposal, that
emotional disorders arise as a reaction to psychosis, is the individual's appraisal of
their psychosis and what it means for their future and current functioning. Supporting
this proposal is Haghighat's (2001) theory of stigmatisation, suggesting that
individual's who have experienced psychosis may perceive themselves as shamed or
socially subordinated because of their patient status.
Further evidence for the proposal that emotional disorder results as a reaction to
psychosis is provided by Birchwood, Iqbal, Chadwick and Trower (2000). In this
study higher rates of post psychotic depression (over 50%) were found in individuals
with first episode psychosis, perhaps as a reaction to their recent diagnosis. In their
second paper Iqbal, Birchwood, Chadwick and Trower (2000) further examined the
appraisals of individuals who experience post psychotic depression. It was found that
the individuals who developed post psychotic depression were more likely to feel
humiliation, loss and entrapment in relation to their psychosis than those who did not
develop depression. Rooke and Birchwood (1998) also found that perceived loss of
autonomy and social role were correlated with depression in psychosis and that
appraisal of entrapment had a high predictive value independent of a variety of
symptom and illness variables. These findings would suggest that it is the
individual's appraisal of their experience rather than the experience per se which
impacts on the development of emotional disorder.
Karen Livingstone 34 D.Clin.Psychol
Freeman, Garety and Kuipers (2001) have also investigated the links between
emotional disturbance and psychotic phenomena. They explored the associations
between the contents of delusional systems and emotional experiences. They found
higher levels of depression in individuals who had higher ratings of the power of
their persecutor, linking with Gilbert's (1992) social ranking theory. The experience
of feeling entrapped, according to social ranking theory, initiates defence
mechanisms forcing the individual to yield to others leading to feelings of inferiority
and self blame. Similar findings have also been reported in relation to auditory
hallucinations and the perceived power of voices (Birchwood, Meaden, Trower,
Gilbert and Plaistow, 2000). They also found some evidence that levels of anxiety
were related to more threatening delusions again highlighting the importance of the
appraisal of the psychotic phenomena. Although Freeman, Garety and Kuipers
(2001) note that levels of emotional distress may be involved in the development of
the content of a delusional belief system, their investigation focussed mainly on
emotional distress resulting from delusions as opposed to the other way round.
Birchwood's (2003) second proposal that disorders of emotion in psychosis may
result from developmental trauma suggests that the early trauma leads to
dysfunctional cognitive schemata which in turn affects the individual's ability to
adapt to their psychosis and its symptoms. Evidence for this proposal comes from
high rates of childhood abuse found in individuals who have experienced psychosis
(e.g. Greenfield, Strakowski, Tohen, Batson and Kolbrener, 1994).
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Drayton, Birchwood and Trower (1998) in a study looking at attachment experience
and recovery from psychosis found that individuals who had a less effective recovery
style (sealing over) perceived their mother and father as less caring than those who
had a more effective recovery style (integration). Further they found that 88% of
individuals in the sealing over group had moderate to severe levels of depression.
Drayton, Birchwood and Trower (1998) suggest that adverse early experiences in
childhood may make individuals more vulnerable to negative self evaluations and
increase their risk of emotional disorders in later life.
Continuity in psychotic symptoms from childhood to adulthood could suggest that
adult psychosis may have it roots early in development. Poulton, Caspi, Moffitt,
Cannon, Murray and Harrington (2000) found evidence of low-level psychotic
phenomena in early adolescence (11 year olds) preceding first episode psychosis.
Birchwood (2003) proposes that these antecedents of psychosis and social risk
factors (such as deprivation and membership of marginalised groups) may effect
psychological and social development leading to low self esteem and difficulty
developing relationships leading to susceptibility to stress.
Emsley, Oosthuizen, Niehaus and Stein (2001) propose that anxiety symptoms in
schizophrenia may be due to adverse life events, the psychotic experience itself,
intoxification or withdrawal from substances, side effects of medications, or a
comorbid anxiety or mood disorder.
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1.5.4 Summary and integration
The literature reviewed above suggests that individuals with psychosis experience a
wide range of emotions, although these have tended to be neglected possibly due to
the historical divide between the neuroses and psychoses. Emotional disturbance has
been found to precede psychosis (Freeman and Garety, 2003; Doherty, van Kammen,
Siris and Marder, 1978), while high rates of comorbid anxiety and depression have
been found in individuals who have experienced psychosis (Cosoff and Hafner,
1988; Brockington, Kendel and Wainwright, 1980; Norman, Malla, Cortese and
Diaz, 1998) suggesting that psychosis is a disorder with significant affective
components.
A variety of explanations have been put forward to explain emotional disturbance in
psychosis ranging from emotional disturbance preceding psychosis (Birchwood,
2003) to emotional disturbance as a result of psychosis (Birchwood, Iqbal, Chadwick
and Trower, 2000). Understanding of emotional disturbance in psychosis may be
enhanced with a consideration of the role of emotion regulation in psychosis.
1.6. Emotion Regulation
1.6.1. Emotion or affect regulation?
The terms affect and emotion are often taken to be synonymous with each other and
are frequently used interchangeably in the literature (Power and Dalgleish, 1997).
While this may cause difficulties in understanding specifically what is being
discussed it has been suggested that this confusion of terms is simply an indicator of
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the current stage of knowledge in this area (Ellgring and Smith, 1998). For the
purpose of this study however it is possible to make some working distinctions.
Affect can be conceptualised as an overarching term encompassing various valenced
subjective states including moods, emotions and dispositional states which differ
principally in terms of specificity and duration (Gross, 1998). It has been suggested
that the term affect should be used to refer to the conscious experience of emotion
(Power, in press) although this has not always been the case (Ellgring and Smith,
1998). Emotion on the other hand can be used to refer to states such as anger,
happiness and sadness which tend to be related to a specific object, be relatively
discrete and lead to a particular response tendency (Gross, 1998). As emotion refers
to a more discreet level of subjective state than affect, it offers a useful level of
analysis for investigation of the regulation of subjective states in individuals with
psychosis.
Gross (1998), following an evolutionary perspective, defines emotions as 'response
tendencies' which have developed in an attempt to adapt to, or solve, environmental
challenges and opportunities. Different emotions have been proposed to serve
different functions (Cole, Michel and O'Donnell Teti, 1994). Power (in press)
suggests that it is possible to identify five basic emotions: sadness; happiness;
disgust; anxiety and anger. More complex emotions such as nostalgia or contempt
have been proposed to result from a combination of basic emotions (Power and
Dalgleish, 1997).
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The present study has reviewed literature using both the terms affect regulation and
emotion regulation. Theories of emotion regulation currently appear to be more
clearly operationalized in the form ofmeasures and this therefore provides a basis for
investigating these processes in individuals who have experienced psychosis.
1.6.2. Definition of emotion regulation
Over the past few decades the domain of emotion regulation has developed as a
distinct field of psychological theory and research (Gross, 1998). Aspects of emotion
regulation have however been around for quite some time and can be seen to
influence many psychotherapeutic approaches (Cole, Michel and O'Donnell Teti,
1994). The literature regarding emotion regulation in psychosis is sparse, although
there has been some work in dual diagnosis groups (Blanchard, Brown, Horan and
Sherwood, 2000). Before considering current understandings of emotional regulation
in psychosis it may be useful to review the overall concept and models of emotion
regulation.
Gross (1998) defines emotion regulation as a broad construct that covers a range of
processes that may be conscious or unconscious, automatic or controlled. In essence
emotion regulation, as defined by Gross (1998), refers to the processes by which
individuals shape the emotions they experience in terms of which emotions they
experience, when they experience them and how they express them.
Thomson (1994) expands this definition by highlighting the goal-oriented, functional
nature of emotion regulation in terms of achieving desired emotional outcomes and
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broader goals. He further adds that emotion regulation processes can be both internal
(e.g. reinterpreting events) and external (e.g. obtaining sympathy from others) to the
individual and stipulates that in order for effective emotion regulation to occur the
individual must first possess the ability to access and evaluate their emotions
accurately.
Emotion regulation should not be considered simply as a matter of increasing the
experience or expression of positively valenced emotions or decreasing the
experience or expression of negatively valenced emotions (Cole et al., 1994).
Regulation of both positively and negatively valenced emotions may lead to changes
in a variety of aspects such as latency, magnitude, duration, expression and
behavioural responses (Gross, 1998)
Emotion regulation can be seen to have its roots in the psychoanalytic as well as the
stress and coping traditions (Gross 1998, 1999). Psychoanalytic theory places much
of its emphasis on conflict between biological impulses and their restraint (especially
in relation to negative emotions). According to psychoanalysts aversive emotions are
managed through the use of ego defences, it is the use of maladaptive ego defences
to regulate emotions which is seen to be at the heart of psychopathology. Emotion
regulation theorists share psychoanalytic concerns in relation to impulse regulation
although also focus on understanding the full range of normal functioning as well as
psychopathology (Gross, 1999).
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The concept of emotion-focussed coping, developed by stress and coping theorists,
has particularly influenced emotion regulation theories (Gross, 1999). At the core of
the stress and coping tradition is the tenet that individuals exhibit similar responses to
a wide variety of stressors, suggesting a particular 'coping style', this can be seen to
be reflected in emotion regulation theory although the focus here is on specific
emotions as opposed to the broader category of stress (Gross, 1998). Another
similarity between emotion regulation and coping theory is the concept of
influencing situation variables and emotional responses (such as avoiding certain
situations or the use of distraction) as a means to minimise negative outcomes or
facilitate preferred ones. Emotion regulation theory can be seen to be related to
coping although is not entirely encapsulated by this broader category (Gross, 1998).
Gross (1999) highlights that emotion regulation can be an ambiguous term referring
to the regulation of emotions themselves or to the regulating functions emotions may
serve. For the purposes of this study the term emotion regulation shall be used to
refer to the regulation of emotions themselves. A further distinction can be made
between emotion regulation in the self or in influencing the emotions experienced by
others. Emotion regulation in this study will be used to refer to the regulation of
emotion in the self, although this may take place in an interpersonal context. Emotion
regulation will also be used to refer to a continuum of processes ranging from
automatic/non-conscious activities to controlled/conscious strategies.
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1.6.3. Development of emotion regulation
Emotion regulation can be viewed as an important developmental task which has its
roots in early infancy (Calkins, 1994). Emotion regulation develops as the result of
interactions between internal and external factors taking place over a number of
years (Thomson, 1994). When considering the development of emotion regulation
skills it is important to bear in mind the individual factors that can impinge upon or
enhance their development. Calkins (1994) suggests a number of factors which may
affect the development of emotion regulation skills: these include factors internal to
the infant, such as neuroregulatory systems, behavioural traits and cognitive style,
and external factors such as parenting style/practices. Caregivers are viewed as
playing a crucial role in the development of emotion regulation, initially by
providing regulation through actions such as soothing progressing towards modelling
of emotion regulation strategies, such as distraction (Calkins, 1994). The
development of emotion regulation can therefore be conceptualised as an interactive
process through a combination of experiences of having one's emotions responded to
and managed by caregivers and observing how other's regulate their own emotions
(Calkins, 1994), although the processes through which these developments occur are
not currently well understood (Cole, Michel and O'Donnell Teti, 1994). During the
development of self regulation an emotional regulation style may develop into a
more stable characteristic which is less amenable to change (Thomson, 1994).
It can be seen that the understandings of the development of emotion regulation are
similar to concepts of attachment theory: where aspects of the caregiving relationship
are internalised as working models for future relationships (Bowlby, 1988). For
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example a key factor in the development of emotion regulation is the beliefs and
expectancies the infant holds about their own and their caregiver's abilities to cope
with and adapt to their emotions (Calkins, 1994). This internal model then impacts
on future emotion regulation strategies by influencing self-regulatory and
interpersonal behaviour (Calkins, 1994).
Thomson (1994) defines optimal emotion regulation in terms of outcome (e.g.
emotions being sufficiently under control to allow for interpersonal functioning) and
process (e.g. enlisting appropriate flexible strategies while allowing access to the
broad range of emotions) although notes that what is optimal may vary for different
individuals, in different situations, with different goals. Calkins (1994) highlights the
importance of effective emotion regulation for successful interpersonal functioning.
The development of optimal emotion regulation is likely to occur in the backdrop of
a close match between the infant's emotional needs at different developmental stages
and the caregivers' ability to identify and meet those needs (Calkins, 1994).
Emotion dysregulation, on the other hand, can be defined, not as an absence of
regulation, but as the use of inflexible strategies which may have served a specific
function, but now interfere with social, cognitive or interpersonal functioning (Cole
et al., 1994). The development of emotional dysregulation may be more likely to
occur in an environment where there has been a lack of consistent appropriate
intervention when the emotional demands of situations exceed the infant's ability to
self regulate (Cole et ah, 1994). Once emotional dysregulation has developed as a
stable characteristic it may be considered as a vulnerability factor in developing
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psychopathology due to dysregulation of social and cognitive processes (Cole et al.,
1994).
1.6.4. Emotion regulation models
Models which have been proposed to outline the processes involved in emotion
regulation vary as to whether they focus on the types of resources the strategy uses
and at which point in the emotion generation process the strategies are employed
(Gross, 1998; 1999).
Eisenberg and Fabes (1995) focussed on the types of resources used and identified
three types of emotion regulation processes. Cognitive strategies were identified, e.g.
cognitive restructuring, in which the emotion experienced was moderated by the
interpretations made of the situation. Behavioural strategies, such as seeking support,
were identified in which the behaviour reflected an attempt to cope with the
experience of emotion. The final strategies identified were situational, for example
attentional control, in which the situation was modified in some way as a reaction to
the initial emotion arousal. These strategies identified by Eisenberg and Fabes (1995)
could be seen to occur at varying points in the emotion arousing experience.
Gross and Munoz (1995) take a different approach to understanding emotion
regulation processes and focus on the stage in the emotion generation process at
which they are employed. They propose two broad types of processes: antecedent-
focussed and response-focussed. Antecedent-focussed emotion regulation relates to
the strategies employed to modify the factors that elicit the emotion prior to it being
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experienced, these can include visiting friends or altering appraisals of the
environment. Response-focussed emotion regulation relates to the strategies
employed to modify the experience of an emotion while it is being experienced, for
example masking feelings of sadness. Gross and Munoz (1995) view these processes
as likely to be reciprocal in nature highlighting the dynamic nature of emotion
regulation. However they suggest that antecedent-focussed strategies are more likely
to be effective overall as they modulate both the experience and expression of the
emotion whilst response focussed strategies are employed following the experience
of emotion and can only impact upon its expression, with limited impact on the
subjective experience of the emotion. This suggestion appears to make intuitive
sense as strategies which occur earlier on in the emotion generation process are likely
to have greater impact than those which occur during the latter stages in the process.
This suggestion has been supported by subsequent research by Gross and Levenson
(1997) investigating the effects of emotional inhibition. They found that response-
focussed strategies, specifically suppression, did not significantly reduce the
subjective experience of negative emotions. They did find however that in relation to
positive emotions suppression tended to reduce the intensity of the emotion
experienced. Gross and Levenson's (1997) findings suggest that response-focussed
emotion regulation, specifically suppression, does not alleviate the subjective
experience of negative emotions however this is not to suggest that it would not be
useful in certain situations. Response-focussed strategies are crucial where
antecedent-focussed strategies are not available or ineffective and the individual
needs to inhibit their emotional expression.
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The antecedent/response-focussed model has been further elaborated by Gross
(1998) who has identified five sets of emotion regulatory processes. This model
proposes four forms of antecedent-focussed emotion regulation and one form of
response-focussed emotion regulation:
1. Situation Selection
The first antecedent-focussed strategy is situation selection; this strategy involves
avoiding or approaching certain people or places based on an appraisal by the
individual of the potential emotion arousing features of the situation, their likely
reaction to the situation and the costs and benefits involved.
2. Situation Modification
The second antecedent-focussed strategy is situation modification; this involves
active attempts to modify some aspect of the situation such as its consequences
and emotional impact. This strategy can be seen to be similar to the concept of
problem-focussed coping (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Gross (1998) notes that
the boundaries between situation selection and modification are not always clear
as efforts which modify a situation may ultimately result in a new situation. He
also notes that emotion expressions can perform an important modification role
for example where a sad expression changes an angry interaction.
3. Attentional Deployment
The third antecedent-focussed strategy is attentional deployment; this involves
directing attention away from or towards particular aspects of the situation. An
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individual may use distraction to divert attention from emotion arousing aspects
of the situation, concentration to focus on particular emotive aspects (such as in
method acting) or rumination in which the attention is focussed directly on the
feelings themselves.
4. Cognitive Change
The fourth and final antecedent-focussed strategy proposed by Gross (1998) is
cognitive change; this involves the evaluations made by the individual regarding
the meaning of the situation and their ability to cope with it. The preliminary
appraisal an individual makes about a situation may be modified through
reappraisal, denial or re-framing.
5. Response Modification
The response-focussed emotion regulation strategy proposed by Gross (1998) is
response modification; this involves direct modification of physiological,
experiential or behavioural responses. Response modification strategies are
employed in the later stages of the emotion generation process. Physiological
responses can be altered through the use of relaxation (in anxiety or anger
inducing situations) or taking drugs, both prescribed and illicit, which can modify
physiological responses as well as impacting upon cognitive elements of an
emotion. Gross (1998) suggests that perhaps the most common form of response
modification is behavioural. Behavioural inhibition has been found to decrease
the experience of some emotions (e.g. amusement) although not others (e.g.
sadness) (Gross and Levenson, 1997).
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While Gross (1998) acknowledges that "our theoretical and empirical grasp of
emotion regulation is still quite uncertain" (Gross 1998: 288) this model may offer a
useful framework in a relatively young field.
Cole et al. (1994) take the view that emotions are inherently regulated and
regulatory. Gross (1998) suggests that questioning whether emotions are regulated or
not is misleading as this suggests that emotion regulation is an all or nothing process,
instead he suggests that it is more appropriate to consider the degree to which
emotions are regulated. Another important consideration highlighted by Gross (1998)
is that the processes involved in the regulation and generation of emotions are likely
to be greatly interwoven. He therefore suggests caution in inferring emotion
regulation from observations alone.
Another important consideration for emotion regulation theorists is whether emotion
regulation strategies can be considered as functional or dysfunctional. It is likely that
different emotion regulation strategies will be functional in some situations and not
in others. Gross (1998) notes that no emotion regulation strategy in itself can be
considered functional or dysfunctional without taking into consideration the context
in which it was employed. However, some individuals may display tendencies
towards particular types of emotion regulation strategies: this may result in an
emotion regulation style that could be classified as generally functional or
dysfunctional. Thomson (1994) suggests the use of outcomes, such as the ability to
control emotions sufficiently for interpersonal relatedness, to assess functionality.
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Phillips (2005) proposes that individual emotion regulation strategies may be
considered as generally functional or dysfunctional in relation to their relationship
with acceptance of emotions. This proposal distinguishes between emotion
regulation strategies which signify acceptance of the emotion and the meaning of that
emotion and those which indicate rejection of the emotion and its meaning, the latter
resulting in the functional value of the emotion being neglected. This distinction
between functional and dysfunctional emotion regulation processes forms the basis
of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire-2 (originally the Child and Adolescent
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, CAERQ) (Phillips, 2005), the only identified
measure which assesses functionality.
When considering emotion regulation it is important not to ignore the role of
individual and cultural beliefs. Individuals and cultures display a wide variability
regarding how, when and to what extent emotions should be regulated. Therefore any
discussion of emotion regulation and the functionality of emotion regulation should
acknowledge the contextual nature of this concept. Indeed, as highlighted by
Thomson (1994), an individual's emotional development is likely to be highly
influenced by the socialisation of emotion to which they were exposed.
1.6.5. Emotion regulation in psychosis
No published empirical studies were found which directly studied emotion regulation
processes or strategies in psychosis. Numerous studies (reviewed above) have
highlighted emotional disturbances in psychosis as well as differences in emotional
expression and experience. These findings could be understood in relation to emotion
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regulation processes. They may suggest that individuals who experience psychosis
have poorer functioning emotional regulation systems or that the increased demands
placed on the systems in a context of psychosis cause them to work less effectively.
Given the dearth of research in the area it is not possible to determine which, if
either, of these suggestions is empirically well supported.
Ellring and Smith (1998) propose that in psychosis the affective regulation systems
are focussed on internal regulation, as opposed to social regulation, and the
individual's resources are directed towards internal regulation. This over absorption
with internal events precludes social regulation as the individual is no longer
attending to external stimuli. The individual is therefore unable to make use of affect
regulation from social encounters and has to rely purely on self generated affect
regulation (Ellring and Smith, 1998).
Emotion regulation theories may offer a possible explanation for the differences
found between emotion experience and expression found in individuals who have
experienced psychosis (Kring and Neale, 1996). The reduced emotional expression
found in individuals who have experienced psychosis may reflect emotion regulation
strategies as opposed to a deficit in expression (Buck, Goldman, Easton, and Norelli
Smith, 1998). In order to regulate their emotions individuals who have experienced
psychosis may suppress their emotional expressions. If this were the case it could
account for the findings of reduced expression and also the findings of reduced
positive emotions and increased negative emotions in psychosis. Gross and Levenson
(1997) found that the use of emotional suppression reduced the experience of
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positive emotions but not negative ones, this strategy is likely therefore to lead to
greater negative emotional experiences. This style of emotion regulation may
generate a vicious circle in which negative emotions are unregulated by suppression
while positive emotions are reduced therefore increasing negative emotional
experiences and the outward expression of flat affect.
Blanchard, Brown, Horan and Sherwood (2000) have suggested that the high rates of
substance abuse found in individuals who have experienced psychosis may reflect a
form of affect regulation. They note that the most common reasons reported by those
who have experienced psychosis and abuse substances are to decrease low mood,
anxiety and tension. Negative affectivity, a trait found in the general population, has
been highlighted by Blanchard et al. (2000) as an important factor in substance abuse
in individuals who have experienced psychosis. Negative affectivity is associated
with increased experience of general negative mood states, a lower tolerance for the
experience of these and a lower tolerance for stress. It is proposed that individuals
with high negative trait affectivity are more likely to experience negative mood states
and to be less tolerant of these and will therefore attempt to regulate their affective
experience. Blanchard et al. (2000) suggest that individuals with high trait negative
affectivity may be more likely to attempt to regulate emotions through substance
abuse. They go on to suggest that individuals who experience psychosis are more
prone to trait negative affectivity.
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1.6.6. Summary and integration
The literature reviewed above shows that while emotion regulation is developing as a
field of psychological theory and research (Gross, 1998) little has been written about
emotion regulation in relation to psychosis. Emotion regulation can be understood as
the processes by which an individual shapes their emotional experience and
expression (Gross, 1998). Links can be drawn between the psychodynamic concept
of ego defences and emotion regulation, although emotion regulation theorists do not
focus solely on psychopathology (Gross, 1999). Models of emotion regulation vary
as to whether they focus on the stage in the emotion generation process strategies are
employed or on the types of resources used.
Although no published research was identified which directly studied emotion
regulation in psychosis numerous studies have highlighted emotional disturbances in
psychosis (see Section 1.5.2). These findings may point to difficulties in emotion
regulation in individuals who experience psychosis. Ellring and Smith (1998) suggest
that individuals who experience psychosis direct all their resources towards internal
regulation precluding social regulation. While Buck et al. (1998) suggest that the
reduced emotional expression found in individuals who experience psychosis may
reflect the emotion regulation strategy of suppression. Blanchard et al. (2000) have
suggested that the increased substance use found in individuals who experience
psychosis may reflected their attempts to regulate their emotions.
Given the limited research in this area this study aims to explore issues of emotional
regulation in psychosis. As suggested earlier psychosis can be viewed as a continuum
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in a similar way to other mental health problems, it may be possible therefore that
emotion regulation strategies may also form a continuum whereby healthy
individuals have greater capacity to regulate their emotions and those with mental
health problems have greater difficulty regulating their emotions. The ability to
regulate emotions may be related to the amount of strategies utilised or to the
functionality of the strategies used. This study seeks to better understand the emotion
regulation process in individuals who have experienced psychosis in comparison
with individuals with a mood or anxiety disorder who have not experienced
psychosis and with individuals who have not experienced any mental health
problems.
As highlighted by Freeman and Garety (2003) it is highly unlikely that a single cause
for psychosis is going to be found therefore research aimed at identifying
contributory factors may prove more fruitful than attempts to identify a single
common cause for symptoms of psychosis. This study therefore aims to explore
emotion regulation as a potential contributory factor in psychosis.
1.7. Coping
If individuals who experience psychosis have difficulties with the regulation of their
emotions it may follow that they find coping with day to day stressors difficult as
they may experience greater levels of emotional dysfunction which may impinge on
their coping abilities. Before looking at coping in individuals who experience
psychosis, it may be useful to briefly summarise some theoretical aspects of coping
in general.
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"Coping is a multifaceted and potentially overinclusive construct" Meyer (2001:
274). Over the last few decades there has been a vast amount written about coping
and stress (Carver, 1997) with many questions, such as how best to measure coping,
remaining unanswered.
Much of the literature on coping can be traced back to Lazarus' (1966, also Lazarus
and Folkman, 1984) model of stress and coping. Lazarus proposed that stress can be
broken down into three processes: primary appraisal which consists of the perception
of threat to oneself; secondary appraisal which consists of identifying potential
responses to the threat and the third process, coping, which involves the
implementation of the response. While these processes appear linear at first they may
involve a number of feedback loops which necessitate the cycle being repeated
(Lazarus, 1966). For example, the realisation of an immediately available coping
response may reduce the initial appraisal of threat while the opposite may also occur,
where an individual initially appraises the situation as unthreatening but due to a
failed coping attempt may reappraise the threat as greater. The process could then be
viewed as cyclical.
To allow further investigation of the coping process Folkman and Lazarus (1980)
developed the Ways of Coping scale. This scale draws a distinction between
problem-focussed coping and emotion-focussed coping. Problem-focussed coping is
aimed at altering the source of the stress or problem solving a response while
emotion-focussed coping is aimed at altering the distress associated with the
situation. Folkman and Lazarus (1980) suggest that while both types of coping can
Karen Livingstone 54 D.Clin.Psychol
often be found in relation to most stressors, problem-focussed coping is more often
employed when there appears to be something constructive that can be done in the
situation while emotion-focussed coping is more often employed when the stressor is
appraised as something which has to be tolerated.
The distinction between problem-focussed coping and emotion-focussed coping has
proven to be too simplistic (Carver, Scheier and Weintraub, 1989). It has been
suggested that the diversity of responses involved in emotion-focussed coping, such
as denial, positive reinterpretation and seeking social support cannot be accounted
for by one factor and that these responses may represent very different levels of
successful coping (Carver, Scheier and Weintraub, 1989). Meanwhile problem-
focussed coping can be viewed as involving a number of different processes ranging
from planning, to taking action, to seeking out assistance, all of which need to be
assessed individually in order to elucidate their adaptive value (Carver, Scheier and
Weintraub, 1989).
1.7.1. Measurement of coping
Carver, Scheier and Weintraub (1989) carried out a survey of coping measures and
identified 3 main issues. Firstly none of the measures they identified covered the
range of areas they felt were of theoretical interest, secondly they felt the scales
tended to lack clear focus highlighted by items which were ambiguous, gave no
indication of why a particular response was being employed and combined
conceptually distinct qualities and thirdly they noted that for the most part the scales
had been developed empirically rather than theoretically. They therefore developed a
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more theoretically driven measure (The COPE) guided by Lazarus' (1966)
conceptualisation of stress and coping and a model of behavioural self-regulation
developed by Scheier and Carver (1988), while also including other aspects of
coping which had been found important in previous studies.
The COPE is a 60 item questionnaire with 4 items per scale however within each
scale the item content has considerable redundancy (Carver, 1997). Participants
completing this questionnaire have been found to become impatient with its length
and also the redundancy of some of the items (Carver, Pozo, Harris, Noreiga,
Scheier, Robinson, Ketcham, Moffat and Clark, 1993) therefore Carver (1997)
decided to develop a briefer form of this scale (The Brief COPE). The Brief COPE
(Carver, 1997) (Appendix 6) is a 28 item questionnaire covering 14 theoretically
derived coping strategies, table 1.1 shows the scales measured by this instrument.
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Table 1.1 Scales included in The BriefCOPE (Carver. 1997)
Scale Description
1. Active Coping Taking active steps to deal with the
situation, similar to Lazarus' (1966)
problem-focussed coping
2. Planning Thinking about possible responses to a
stressor, occurs during Lazarus' (1966)
secondary appraisal phase
3. Positive Refraining Thinking about the situation in more
positive terms to help reduce the distress
associated with the stressor
4. Acceptance Accepting the reality of the situation or
accepting being unable to change the
situation immediately
5. Humour Making jokes about the situation
6. Religion Turning to religion at times of stress,
either for emotional support or positive
reframing
7. Using Emotional Support Seeking out moral support or sympathy
8. Using Instrumental Support Seeking out advice or assistance
9. Self-Distraction Distracting oneself from the distress
associated with the stressor by focussing
on other activities
10. Denial Denying the reality of the situation
11. Venting Venting feelings of distress related to the
stressor
12. Substance Use Using alcohol or drugs to reduce distress
13. Behavioural Disengagement Reducing efforts or giving up trying to
deal with the stressor
14. Self-Blame Blaming or criticising oneself
There is no single measure that covers all possible areas of coping and even if one
were developed it is likely to increase participant response burden to such an extent
that it makes research projects unwieldy. The BriefCOPE (Carver, 1997) can be seen
to include a broad variety of coping strategies, adaptive and maladaptive as well as
problem-focussed and emotion-focussed and may be most useful when one wants to
have an overview of the coping strategies most often utilised by participants. It can
also be used situationally and dispositionally, dependent on the focus of the research.
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1.7.2. Coping in psychosis
The use of coping strategies in psychosis has not been comprehensively studied and
much of the research has focussed on individuals with diagnoses such as
schizophrenia (MacDonald, Pica, McDonald, Hayes and Baglioni, 1998). As will be
demonstrated by the following review much of the research into coping in
individuals who experience psychosis has focussed on how they cope with factors
related to their psychotic symptoms.
Meyer (2001) notes that the challenge of coping for individuals who experience
psychosis is twofold in that they have to cope with the experience of their symptoms
as well as the broader implications for their personal and social lives and roles.
Meyer (2001) compared coping in individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia with
individuals with affective disorders and found that those with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia were less likely to cope adaptively (utilising strategies such as
acceptance, active coping, planning and emotional support seeking) although they
were no more or less likely to utilise maladaptive coping strategies (such as denial,
disengagement, self-blame and venting). Meyer (2001) found that psychological
wellbeing was positively correlated with adaptive coping and negatively correlated
with maladaptive coping. Deficits in adaptive coping were found to mediate
schizophrenic symptom severity and concurrent social functioning. Meyer (2001)
suggests that this means that those with more severe symptoms functioned less well
socially as a result of being less able to cope rather than as a function of their
symptoms per se.
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Falloon and Talbot (1981) carried out a study to investigate coping strategies in
individuals who regularly heard voices. They asked 40 participants to describe the
coping strategies they used for dealing with their voices. They found 3 main areas in
which participants made changes in order to cope with their voices: behaviour,
sensory/affective state and cognition. Behaviourally participants described changing
their posture (lying down or walking), increasing activity and increasing
interpersonal contact. In relation to arousal levels participants reported using
methods both to decrease and increase arousal level. For example to decrease arousal
levels participants described using relaxation, sleeping, using ear plugs and covering
their eyes, while others described increasing arousal through physical exercise,
listening to loud music and pacing. Cognitive coping methods identified were
attentional control, such as ignoring voices or actively listening to them, controlling
the onset of voices and suppression, some participants noted that they accepted their
voices and reflected upon and used their guidance. The types of coping strategies
used were found to be similar in groups of patients diagnosed with and without
affective components to their illness. They found that those who appeared to be
coping better used fewer strategies, which, although not differing qualitatively from
the strategies used by those who coped less well, were applied more consistently and
with greater confidence. They also noted that those who tended to cope better with
their voices often avoided situations or stimuli which were associated with the onset
of their hallucinations.
Farhall and Gehrke (1997) also carried out a study to investigate coping in 81
individuals who experienced hallucinations. They looked at general as well as
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hallucination-specific strategies. The most common general strategies used were
taking action about the problem, mental disengagement, behavioural disengagement
and decreasing physiological arousal, the most common hallucination-specific
strategy identified was interacting with the voice. In a factor analysis they identified
3 factors accounting for 32% of the variance, these were 'active acceptance'
(listening to and accepting voices), 'passive coping' (reliance on external support)
and 'resistance coping' (action directed against voices). They found that passive
coping predicted emotion control and that resistance control negatively predicted
emotion control.
A further study which investigated coping with hallucinations was carried out by
Singh, Sharan and Kulhara (2003). They looked at the coping strategies used by 75
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia. They found that help seeking strategies
were used most frequently followed by coping through diversion. Each participant
reported using on average 1 problem-solving coping strategy whilst coping through
avoidance was least common. They found overall that participants with higher
distress scores tended to use a greater number of coping strategies and suggested this
may be due to them experiencing greater distress and therefore attempting to cope
with that distress or that this may highlight the ineffectiveness of the strategies they
were employing.
The studies aimed at understanding coping with symptomatology appear to suggest
that individuals who experience psychosis are less likely to utilise what could be
considered adaptive coping strategies than those with affective disorders. The
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research also suggests that those who are functioning better tend to utilise fewer
coping strategies, although it is unclear whether that is because they are using more
effective coping strategies or are less distressed to begin with. It would also appear
that help seeking strategies are commonly used in individuals who experience
psychosis.
Strous, Ratner, Gibel, Ponizovsky and Ritsner (2005) investigated coping at
exacerbation and stabilisation phases in schizophrenia. They found that emotion-
orientated coping strategies were used more often at the exacerbation phase of
illness, when higher levels of distress were apparent. The amount of task or
avoidance oriented coping strategies did not change from exacerbation to
stabilisation. They found a strong association between level of distress and the use of
emotion orientated coping strategies. Emotion orientated coping may be less
adaptive/effective than task orientated coping, which is more problem solving in
nature and therefore may be related to levels of distress as the person attempts coping
strategies which then fail. Equally the high association between distress and emotion
orientated coping may reflect high distress levels leading to increased efforts to
control emotions.
The finding of higher levels of emotion orientated coping at exacerbation of illness
may be related to the emotion regulation literature. If an individual struggles to
regulate their emotions this may be reflected in greater attempts to cope with their
distress through emotion orientated coping strategies, also it is likely that emotion
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dysregulation is linked to maladaptive emotion regulation strategies which may be
related to the failure of emotion orientated coping strategies.
MacDonald, Pica, McDonald, Hayes and Baglioni (1998) carried out a study looking
at coping strategies in psychosis for a range of stressful situations (symptom related,
relationship difficulties and everyday functioning). They compared a group of 50
individuals with early psychosis with a matched group without psychiatric diagnosis.
They found that the psychosis group used a smaller range of coping strategies than
the non-clinical group and did not perceive themselves as coping with stressors as
well as the non-clinical group. The participants in the psychosis group were found to
use more emotion focussed coping strategies than the non-clinical group. MacDonald
et al. (1998) suggest that the use of emotion focussed coping strategies in the
psychosis group may be consistent with the recovery style of 'sealing over'
(McGlashan, 1987), whereby individuals isolate their psychotic experiences in order
to reduce the distress associated with them.
MacCarthy, Benson and Brewin (1986) carried out a study into coping in long-term
psychiatric patients, comprising mainly of individuals with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia. These participants reported finding greater difficulty in coping with
stressors which they found most distressing. They noted that the participants had few
ideas about how to cope with the difficulties they experienced and that their efforts
often appeared to lack a clear focus. It is unclear from this study whether the
participants found certain problems in themselves more distressing than others or
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whether being unable to identify possible strategies for dealing with the problems
caused greater levels of distress.
Van den Bosch, Van Asma, Rombouts and Louwerens (1992) investigated general
coping style in schizophrenia. They found that alongside depression and neurosis
groups, the schizophrenic group rated themselves higher on depressive reaction and
lower on problem solving in comparison to healthy controls. They also found that
participants in the schizophrenic group were more likely to endorse items related to
avoidance. They did not find any evidence for cognitive functioning impinging on
coping abilities however they did find that subjective experience of cognitive
difficulties, such as distractibility, was related to coping. Overall this study found
that the participants diagnosed with schizophrenia did not rate themselves
significantly different from depressive and neurosis groups with regard to coping
dimensions.
Horan and Blanchard (2003) compared coping in 36 individuals diagnosed with
schizophrenia to 15 non-psychiatric controls. They found that the schizophrenia
group was characterised by more common use of maladaptive coping strategies.
They further found that maladaptive coping, together with trait negative affectivity,
accounted for approximately 25% of the variance in negative mood during a role
play task involving assertion. This finding suggests it is important to consider the
role of trait factors and coping in subjectively experienced stress in individuals who
have experienced psychosis.
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Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, Delespaul and Van Os (2003) have suggested that
individuals who experience psychosis may have heightened emotional reactivity to
everyday life stressors. In their study of 42 individuals who had experienced
psychosis they found that while a history of life events did not significantly increase
the subjective stressfulness of daily events they did appear to increase emotional
reactivity to everyday life stressors. They therefore suggest that life events influence
an underlying vulnerability for psychosis through the increase in emotional reactivity
to everyday stressors. Given that previous research has found that difficulties which
are more distressing are related to more maladaptive coping strategies (MacCarthy,
Benson and Brewin, 1986) the finding of greater emotional reactivity to daily
stressors could suggest that individuals who have experienced psychosis are more
likely to become distressed by everyday events and cope with them in a less adaptive
fashion.
1.7.3. Summary and integration
While the above studies have focussed on slightly different aspects of coping with
everyday stressors they overall appear to suggest that individuals who experience
psychosis exhibit a smaller range of coping strategies and find it more difficult to
identify coping strategies for the difficulties which they find most distressing. The
research also suggests that individuals who experience psychosis use more emotion
focussed coping strategies, more avoidance and less problem solving strategies. The
findings of heightened emotional reactivity to everyday stressors in individuals who
have experienced psychosis could suggest that they are more likely to become
Karen Livingstone 64 D.Clin.Psychol
distressed when faced with everyday stressors and to cope with them in a less
adaptive manner.
This study aims to better understand the experience of individuals who experience
psychosis compared with those with anxiety/mood disorders and the general
population, the focus therefore will be on how individuals cope with day to day life
stressors which everyone may experience as opposed to symptom specific stressors.
1.8. Rationale for the present study
The literature reviewed has shown that, contrary to Kraepelinian ideas, individuals
who have experienced psychosis also experience a wide range of emotions, although
to date emotion regulation processes or strategies in psychosis are poorly understood.
In order to develop effective treatments for the wide range of difficulties reported by
those who experience psychosis it is essential to gain a better understanding of the
role of emotions and emotion regulation in psychosis.
Based on the research reviewed it is reasonable to conceptualise psychosis as a
disorder with significant affective elements, which may be understood in a similar
way to anxiety/mood disorders. This conceptualisation would suggest that
individuals who experience psychosis are likely to have difficulties with the
regulation of their emotions in a similar way to those with anxiety/mood disorders.
What is currently largely unknown is the extent to which individuals who experience
psychosis have difficulties with the regulation of their emotions. As noted earlier it
is unlikely that any one single cause will be found to explain the occurrence of
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psychosis however it is possible to consider potential contributory and maintaining
factors, of which emotion regulation may be one. The focus of the present research
study is then on emotion regulation in psychosis in comparison with anxiety/mood
disorder and healthy controls.
This exploratory study can be placed within the broader context of increasing interest
being paid to emotional functioning in psychosis (Bentall, 2003). The theories and
research studies described above have highlighted several ways in which emotional
experience and expression in psychosis differs from the general population, however
they also point to the possibility of emotional experience in psychosis lying on a
continuum with other affective disorders. This continuum is likely to be related to
effective or ineffective emotion regulation strategies. The ability or inability to
regulate emotions may also be reflected in an individual's general coping style. If
they experience high levels of emotional disturbance they may be more likely to use
emotion focussed coping strategies and may also use less effective strategies due to
their high concurrent levels of distress.
In assessing emotion regulation, emotional experience and coping in psychosis it is
important to consider the following questions which will be addressed in this thesis:
• Do individuals who experience psychosis show similar levels of emotional
disturbance as those with anxiety/mood disorders and are these greater than
the general population?
• Do individuals who experience psychosis have similar difficulties with the
regulation of their emotions as those with anxiety/mood disorders and are
these greater than the general population?
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• Do individuals who experience psychosis and individuals who have
anxiety/mood disorders use less adaptive coping strategies when faced with
day to day life stressors?
The aim of this study then is to examine these questions by measuring emotional
experience, emotion regulation and coping and comparing these for three groups of
individuals: one group comprising of individuals who have experienced psychosis,
one group comprising of individuals with anxiety/mood disorders who have not
experienced psychosis and a group of healthy controls.
In relation to the question concerning difficulties with emotion regulation, this
requires some consideration in terms of how difficulties with emotion regulation may
be operationalized. Gross and Levenson (1997) have suggested that response-
focussed emotion regulation strategies are less effective than antecedent-focussed
strategies in modifying an individual's experience of negative emotions, given that
they are employed once the emotion has been generated. For the purposes of this
study emotion regulation which is characterised by a greater use of response-
focussed strategies will be considered to reflect difficulties with emotion regulation.
The only currently available measure which allows for distinction between
antecedent and response-focussed strategies uses expressive suppression to
characterise response-focussed emotion regulation. This study will therefore assess
whether the clinical groups tend to use this response-focussed strategy to a greater
extent than the healthy controls.
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It has been proposed that individuals develop a stable style of emotion regulation
(Thomson, 1994). If an individual is characterised by using a less effective emotion
regulation strategies, such as response-focussed ones, it may follow that they also use
less functional strategies to regulate their emotions as part of a broader pattern of
dysfunctional emotion regulation. As with antecedent/response- focussed strategies
there is only one currently available measure which operationalizes functional and
dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies (Phillips, 2005) which shall be used to
evaluate these questions.
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1.9. Research question and hypotheses
The primary research question of this study can be summarised as follows:
Is there a significant difference in emotion regulation between groups of individuals
who have experienced psychosis, who have an anxiety/mood disorder and have not
experienced psychosis and healthy volunteers?
The research hypotheses are as follows:
1. Individuals who experience psychosis and individuals who have an
anxiety/mood disorder who have not experienced psychosis will attempt to
regulate their emotions in similar ways and that this will differ from healthy
volunteers.
2. The current emotional state of individuals who experience psychosis will be
similar to that of those who have an anxiety/mood disorder who have not
experienced psychosis and that this will differ from healthy volunteers.
3. The general emotional state of individuals who experience psychosis will be
similar to that of those who have an anxiety/mood disorder who have not
experienced psychosis and that this will differ from healthy volunteers.
4. Individuals who experience psychosis will use similar coping strategies as
individuals with an anxiety/mood disorder who have not experienced
psychosis and that this will differ from healthy volunteers.
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Chapter 2: Methodology
2.1. Design
A quantitative methodology was adopted as most appropriate to the research
question. The research used a between-groups design and was based on an
opportunity sample of patients attending clinical psychology departments.
Individuals were allocated to groups on the basis of whether they had experienced
symptoms of psychosis (psychosis group) or had an anxiety or mood disorder
(anxiety/mood group) and had not experienced psychosis. The control group
(individuals who were not receiving psychological intervention) consisted of an
opportunity sample of colleagues, co-workers and acquaintances.
2.2. Power analysis
In order to establish the number of participants required in each group a prospective
power analysis was carried out (Clark-Carter, 2004). There was no data available
which may have indicated the expected effect sizes of the between group differences
on the relevant variables. Therefore, the effect size considered to be of interest was
used in these calculations. This was set at a large effect size of d = 0.8 as large
between-group differences were considered to be of clinical import. Based on these
parameters, it was established using power tables in Clark-Carter (2004) for power =
0.8 and a = 0.05 to have 21 participants in each group for the use of ANOVA in the
analyses.
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2.3. Participants
Three groups of participants were recruited for this study. The first group consisted
of 21 individuals (12 males, 9 females; mean age = 39.26, s.d. = 11.30) who had
experienced one or more psychotic episodes in their lives and who were currently
well enough to consent and take part in the study. All participants had a diagnosis of
Schizophrenia, Paranoid Schizophrenia, Schizoaffective Disorder, Psychosis or
Bipolar Disorder with psychotic features, confirmed by their referring clinician. The
diagnoses were not confirmed through diagnostic interview, as for the purposes of
this study, the experience of psychosis was considered more important than specific
diagnoses. Participants in the psychosis group were recruited from Clinical
Psychology Departments in Lothian. The second group consisted of 21 individuals (5
males, 16 females; mean age = 40.52, s.d. = 10.67) who were currently being seen by
Clinical Psychologists in Lothian for help with anxiety or mood disorders and had
never experienced a psychotic episode.
Participants in the two clinical groups were given a Participant Information Sheet
(Appendix 2) during a routine appointment with their Clinical Psychologist and
asked to take part in the study. In doing so the voluntary nature of participation was
emphasised and they were given as long as necessary to decide.
The third group consisted of 21 healthy participants (12 males, 9 females; mean age
= 40.00, s.d. = 11.88) with no known history of (or current) emotional disorder who
were matched to the psychosis group for age and gender. They consisted of an
opportunity sample and included NHS Lothian employees and acquaintances.
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2.4. Measures and rationale for their selection
2.4.1. Self-report measures and psychosis
This study adopted a self-report methodology as previous research has found that
individuals diagnosed with psychosis are able to provide valid and reliable self-
reports on measures of anxiety and depression (Huppert, Smith and Apfeldorf, 2002).
Rather than use a number of questionnaires in order to measure emotional experience
it seemed most appropriate to identify one measure which could assess negative and
positive emotional experience, as previous research has suggested that there is some
overlap in measures of anxiety and depression in this group (Norman, Malla, Cortese
and Diaz, 1998). The literature reviewed above suggests that emotion regulation
should be measured both in terms of functionality and whether it is antecedent or
response-focussed. The research on coping calls for a measure which covers as many
relevant coping strategies as possible without significantly increasing participant
response burden.
2.4.2. The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross and John, 2003) (Appendix 3)
is a 10-item questionnaire designed to measure the use of 2 emotion regulation
strategies: Cognitive Reappraisal (6 items) and Expressive Suppression (4 items).
Cognitive Reappraisal is a form of antecedent-focussed emotion regulation whereby
the individual modifies their thoughts about a potential emotion-eliciting situation in
order to alter its emotional impact. Expression suppression is a form of response-
focussed emotion regulation whereby the individual inhibits their emotional
expression once the emotion has been elicited. Gross and John (2003) have found
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antecedent and response-focussed strategies to be relatively independent of one
another.
The ERQ requires the respondent to rate their agreement with each item using a 7-
point Likert Scale (scored 1-7) in relation to how they respond to their emotions.
Total scores for Cognitive Reappraisal (6-42) and Expressive Suppression (4-28) are
then calculated. No research was identified that has used this measure with clinical
groups, however Gross and John (2003) report data for non-clinical groups
suggesting the scales have good internal reliability (Reappraisal a=.79; Suppression
a=.73) and good test-retest reliability (a=.69 over 3 months for both scales).
The development of standardised measures for the assessment of emotion regulation
is still in the early stages. Comparison data is therefore restricted to non-clinical
groups. However the ERQ appears to be accessible to participants, possibly in part
due to its brevity (Hodgson, 2005) and is also derived from a clear process model of
emotion regulation strategies which may enhance interpretation of findings.
2.4.3. The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 2 (ERQ-2)
The ERQ-2 (Phillips, 2005) (Appendix 4) was developed as a measure of emotional
regulation for children and adolescents, in the context of a lack of existing measures.
It is based on a model of emotion regulation, derived from the literature, which
categorises emotion regulation strategies as functional or dysfunctional (in relation to
acceptance or rejection of emotional state) and as an internal regulatory strategy (e.g.
cognitive change) or an external regulatory strategy (e.g. environmental change)
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(Phillips, 2005). The ERQ-2 asks respondents to rate how often, in general, they
engage in the use of the strategies in response to their emotions, on a 5 point Likert
Scale (scored 1-5).
The items of the ERQ-2 were developed to represent emotion regulation strategies
identified from the literature and were classified in relation to the model based on the
consensus of a panel of experts. A 32-item pilot scale resulted which was refined to a
19-item scale as the result of item analysis, MAP analysis and factor analysis of the
scale structures (based on a sample of 351 questionnaires completed by children and
adolescents). Confirmatory factor analysis (using the same sample) supported a
model of emotion regulation strategies which categorises strategies on the basis of
functionality and the use of internal/external resources.
The child and adolescent validation sample showed good internal reliability (Table
2.1). Power (in preparation) has added 2 further items to the External-Functional
scale in an attempt to increase the internal reliability of this scale (Appendix 4, items
20 and 21). At the time of writing there was no data available on the test-retest
reliability of the scales.
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Philips (2005) assessed the construct validity of the ERQ-2 by comparing the scores
with a number of existing child and adolescent measures relating to emotional and
behavioural functioning. The outcome of the analyses were very favourable with
strong relationships being found between the dysfunctional scales and the experience
of negative emotions, difficulties (as measured by the Strengths and Difficulties
Questionnaire, Goodman 1997) and increased psychosomatic complaints, while the
functional scales were found to be negatively correlated with difficulties and
positively correlated with health related quality of life. Overall the findings are
supportive of good construct validity in the ERQ-2, suggesting it may be an
appropriate measure to use in the present study.
As the ERQ-2 has not yet been validated with the general adult or adult clinical
populations this will place limitations on the interpretation of the present studies
findings. However, given the dearth of appropriate measures of emotion regulation
and the unique consideration of functionality of emotion regulation strategies, the
ERQ-2 may be viewed as a valuable addition to the research design.
2.4.4. The Basic Emotions Scale
The Basic Emotions Scale (BES, Power in press) (Appendix 5) is a self report
measure of emotion which measures experience of five 'basic' emotions (anger,
sadness, disgust, fear and happiness) over the last week and in general, as well as
including a scale of perceived coping with emotions. The respondent uses a 7-point
Likert Scale (scored 1-7) to rate the degree to which they have experienced the
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emotions or feel that they can cope with the emotions. A total score is then derived
for each scale (4-28).
The BES was developed from a categorical approach to emotions which views
emotions in terms of discrete categories of 'basic' emotions from which more
complex emotions are derived (Power, in press). The emotions are considered as
'basic' as they can be identified early in development and appear across cultures.
Although there has been some debate as to the exact number of 'basic' emotions
(Power and Dalgleish, 1997) the five emotions (anger, sadness, disgust, fear and
happiness) included in the BES appear on nearly all 'basic' emotion lists (Power, in
press).
A 30-item pilot scale was developed which was refined to a 20 item scale as the
result of item analysis and MAP analysis of the scale structures (based on a sample
of 219 questionnaires completed by students). Confirmatory factor analysis (using
the same sample) supported a model of five 'basic' emotions, correlated with each
other, which can become 'coupled' together in the form ofmore complex emotions.
Internal reliability was assessed using Cronbach alpha (Table 2.2) and found the
scales to have good internal reliability. At the time of writing there was no data
available on the test-retest reliability of the scales.
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The above analyses were carried out in relation to the trait-like 'in general' scale of
the BES as the state-like 'past-week' ratings showed poor item distributions
(particularly in the disgust category).
As the BES has not yet been validated with clinical populations caution will be used
in the interpretation of the present studies findings. However the benefits of the BES
are that it allows for the assessment of a number of emotions in one scale, thereby
reducing participant response burden, and is derived from a clear categorical theory
of basic emotions.
2.4.5. The Brief COPE
The Brief COPE (Carver, 1997) (Appendix 6) is an abbreviated version of the COPE
(Carver, Scheier and Weintraub, 1989) covering 14 theoretically derived coping
strategies. The scales of the briefCOPE can be grouped into adaptive (scales 1-8, see
Table 2.3) and maladaptive (scales 9-14, see Table 2.3) as well as emotion
(emotional support, venting and positive reframing scales) and problem-focussed
(active coping, planning and instrumental support scales) scales (Meyer, 2001;
Carver, Scheier and Weintraub, 1989). The respondent uses a 4-point Likert Scale
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(scored 1 -4) to rate the degree to which they generally engage in each of the coping
strategies. A total score is then derived for each of the 14 scales (2-8).
Carver (1997) examined the psychometric properties of the Brief COPE with a
sample of 168 hurricane survivors (124 completed the second assessment and 126
completed the third assessment). Internal reliability was assessed using Cronbach
alpha averaged across the 3 administrations in the sample (Table 2.3), the scales were
found to have acceptable internal reliability (although some alpha coefficients were
between .50 and 60) despite being derived from 2 items each.
Table 2.3 Internal reliability of the BriefCOPE subscales.
Subscale N a
Active Coping 318 .68
Planning 318 .73




Emotional Support 318 .71




Substance Use 318 .90
Behavioural Disengagement 318 .65
Self-Blame 318 .69
Exploratory factor analysis yielded a complex factor structure, with 9 factors
accounting for 72.4% of the variance (Carver, 1997). This factor structure is very
similar to the factor structure found for the full inventory (Carver, Scheier and
Weintraub, 1989).
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Although the convergent and discriminant validity of the Brief COPE has yet to be
documented there is data available regarding the original COPE, from which the
majority of the Brief COPE items were adopted. Carver, Scheier and Weintraub
(1989) found strong evidence for the convergent and discriminant validity of the
COPE as the scales were found to correlate with theoretically related dimensions,
including self-esteem, hardiness, trait anxiety and optimism. They also noted that the
scales were not strongly correlated with social desirability suggesting they are valid
measures less affected by desirability. Clark, Bormann, Cropanzano and James
(1995) compared the COPE with 2 other popular coping inventories, The Coping
Strategy Indicator (Amirkhan, 1990) and the Ways of Coping-Revised (Folkman and
Lazarus, 1985). They replicated the internal factor structure of the original COPE
found by Carver, Scheier and Weintraub (1989), they found the COPE had high
convergent validity with the other two measures as well as good discriminant
validity. They also found that the COPE was able to predict negative affectivity.
Overall the COPE was found to be able to explain more of the variance in outcome
measures than two coping scales it was compared with.
As noted by Meyer (2001) there is no "universally accepted methodology to assess
coping" (2001: 266). The Brief COPE was chosen for the purposes of this study as it
measures a broad variety of adaptive and maladaptive as well as emotion and
problem-focussed dimensions. The Brief COPE was chosen as opposed to its
predecessor the COPE as previous research had found participants became impatient
with the redundancy of some of the items in the COPE (Carver, Pozo, Harris,
Noriega, Scheier, Robinson, Ketcham, Moffat and Clark, 1993) and reducing
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participant response burden was considered an important ethical aspect of the present
study.
2.5. Procedure
As noted above potential participants were given an information sheet during their
routine appointment with their clinical psychologist and asked if they would be
willing to take part in the study. If they were willing to take part the psychologist
passed their contact details to the researcher who then contacted them by phone to
arrange a suitable time to meet, either at the clinic where they saw their psychologist
or at their home, if requested (and appropriate). All participants met with the
researcher individually to complete the questionnaires which took around 30 minutes
to 1 hour.
A standard procedure was followed in the research sessions. The participant was
initially given the opportunity to ask any questions they had about the study based on
the information provided, and then asked to sign a consent form. The measures were
then completed in a standard order (Table 2.4). For each participant the researcher
went over the instructions of the questionnaires and answered any queries about
individual items. Once all the measures had been completed the participant had the
opportunity to ask any further questions or make any comments about the study.
They were then thanked for their participation and asked whether they would like to
receive a summary of the findings from the research.
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Table 2,4 Order of administration ofmeasures
Order Measure
1 The Basic Emotions Scale
2 ERQ
3 ERQ-2
4 The Brief COPE
The participants' GPs and psychiatrists (for those being seen by psychiatry) were
informed by letter that the individual had taken part in the study. The procedure and
documentation used all conformed to COREC guidelines. Participants also had the
researcher's and research supervisor's contact details on the information sheet in
order that they could re-contact the researcher or supervisor with any further queries
or concerns.
2.6. Ethical issues
A number of ethical issues were taken into consideration in the planning of this
study. Response burden for the participants was viewed as a critical consideration
therefore the measures selected for use in this study were chosen as they covered the
relevant areas with the fewest items. As with any one to one interaction there was the
potential that participants may have found some of the questions sensitive or
upsetting, this possibility was dealt with by advising the participants that they did not
have to answer any questions they felt uncomfortable with and that they could decide
to withdraw their participation at any time (no participants asked for the interview to
be terminated nor refused to answer any questions). All the participants were
currently being seen by clinical psychologists and therefore there was also the
opportunity for them to discuss any concerns they had about the study with their
clinician. Travelling expenses were not available for the participants in this study, to
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minimise any inconvenience participants were offered the opportunity to be
interviewed at their usual treatment centre (often directly after their appointment with
their clinical psychologist) or at home. Dissemination of results was also viewed as
an important ethical consideration. The participants in this study were offered written
feedback of the results. The results will be presented at the Clinical Psychology
department's research meeting. It is also planned that the study will be written up for
submission for publication.
The study proposal was reviewed by the relevant Local Research Ethics Committee
(Appendix 1), which approved the research being carried out in the Lothian area.
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Chapter 3: Results
3.1. Exploratory analyses
Exploratory analyses were carried out in order to ascertain whether the data met the
assumptions regarding normality and homogeneity of variance required for
parametric tests. Normality was assessed by examining histograms and the skewness
and kurtosis of each distribution (Appendix 7), outliers on box-plots were also taken
into consideration when assessing the distribution. Homogeneity of variance was
assessed by carrying out Levene's test. Throughout the analyses, whenever
homogeneity of variance could not be assumed as indicated by Levene's test,
adjusted degrees of freedom were used to calculate the t values in group
comparisons. It was planned to use one-way ANOVAs subject to parametric
assumptions being met. To reduce repetition, unless stated otherwise, the parametric
assumptions for conducting one-way ANOVAs have been assessed and satisfied in
each case. Although some of the data showed slight skewness and kurtosis it
appeared that much of this was due to outliers, it was therefore decided that it would
not be appropriate to do uniform transformations. Also the techniques used were
considered to be significantly robust to accommodate these variances (Howell,
1995). As a precaution the results of the ANOVAs were checked with non-
parametric statistics (Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance) and in each case
the results remained the same.
The measures in the study were all based on Likert scales, which strictly produce
ordinal level data as the interval between scores may not be equal. However, in
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psychological research, it is conventional to treat such data as interval if there is a
significantly large range of possible scores for the dimensions to be analysed (Clark-
Carter, 2004). It is assumed therefore that the scales have approximately equal
intervals and that sufficient checks would be carried out, such as examining the
distribution of the data, to ensure that that this assumption is not significantly
contravened. As the measures used in this study have undergone validation studies
and some process of standardisation, it is considered appropriate to assume
approximation to interval level data. Furthermore the data used in this study was
based on total scores summed from individual Likert responses and is therefore from
an approximate continuous distribution.
3.2. Sample characteristics






Gender (M/F) 12/9 5/16 12/9
Age (Std Dev) 39.26 (11.30) 40.52 (10.67) 40.00 (11.88)
The overall mean age for the participants in this study was 39.93 years (£0=11.12).
A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant difference in age between the 3 groups,
F(2,60) = 0.065, p > 0.05.
As can be seen in table 3.1 the psychosis and healthy volunteer groups had the same
ratio of males to females while the anxiety/mood disorder group consisted of a
greater proportion of females. A 2x3 chi square found a significant difference in
gender between the 3 groups, x2 (2) = 6.262, p < 0.05.
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Two-tailed independent samples t-tests were carried out in order to determine
whether, for each group, there was a significant difference between males and
females in each of the variables and gender would therefore need to be controlled for
in further analyses. In the psychosis group males were found to score significantly
higher than females on the Cognitive Reappraisal subscale of the ERQ, t (19) =
2.918, p < 0.05 (male mean score = 28.25, female mean score = 18.78), on the Denial
subscale of the Brief COPE, t (19) = 2.509, p < 0.05 (male mean score = 4.67, female
mean score = 3.11), while females were found to score significantly higher than
males on the Self-blame subscale of the Brief COPE, t (19) = -2.364, p < 0.05 (male
mean score = 5.83, female mean score = 7.11). In the anxiety/mood disorder group
females were found to score significantly higher than males on the Overall General
scale of the BES, t (18.714) = -3.251, p < 0.05 (male mean score = 71.60, female
mean score = 83.44) and on the Denial subscale of the BriefCOPE, t (15) = -3.967, p
< 0.05 (male mean score = 2.00, female mean score = 3.69. In the healthy volunteer
group males were found to score significantly higher on the Planning subscale of the
Brief COPE, t (19) = 2.321, p < 0.05 (male mean score = 6.42, female mean score =
5.44). Gender will therefore be controlled for in the analyses of the above variables.
3.3. Hypotheses testing
3.3.1. Hypothesis 1:
Individuals who experience psychosis and individuals who have an anxiety/mood
disorder who have not experienced psychosis will attempt to regulate their emotions
in similar ways and that this will differ from healthy volunteers.
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Scores on the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) and the Emotion Regulation
Questionnaire-2 (ERQ-2) were used to assess Hypothesis 1.
3.3.1.1. ERO subscales
The ERQ is a 10 item questionnaire designed to measure the use of 2 emotion
regulation strategies: Cognitive Reappraisal and Expressive Suppression. Cognitive
Reappraisal is a form of antecedent-focussed emotion regulation whereby an
individual modifies their thoughts about a potential emotion-eliciting situation in
order to alter its emotional impact. Expressive Suppression is a form of response-
focussed emotion regulation whereby the individual inhibits their emotional
expression once the emotion has been elicited. The total score for the Cognitive
Reappraisal subscale is based on summing the scores for 6 items and the possible
range of scoring is 6-42 with higher scores indicating greater use of this strategy. The
total score for the Expressive Suppression subscale is based on summing the scores
for 4 items and the possible range of scoring is 4-28 with higher scores indicating
greater use of this strategy. Descriptive statistics for total scores on the Expressive
Suppression and Cognitive Reappraisal subscales of the ERQ are presented in
appendix 7.
As illustrated in Figure 3.1 the group mean total scores show a difference in the
predicted direction with the 2 clinical groups scoring similar to each other and
different to the healthy volunteers for both Cognitive Reappraisal and Expressive
Suppression subscales.
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Figure 3.1 Mean scores on ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal and Expressive Suppression





Cognitive Reappraisal Expressive Suppression
Emotion Regulation Strategy
As noted above males in the psychosis group were found to score higher than
females on the Cognitive Reappraisal subscale of the ERQ. Gender was therefore
controlled for in a one-way ANCOVA analysis of this variable and was found to
have no significant main effect, F(l,59) = 0.923, p > 0.05, while group was found to
have a significant main effect, F(2,59) = 4.611, p < 0.05. A one-way ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of group, F(2,60) = 5.161, p < 0.05. In order to
determine whether the significant main effect in group lay post hoc contrast t-tests
were carried out, they found a significant difference when comparing the 2 clinical
groups together to the healthy volunteers, t(59.51) = -4.003, p < 0.025, with no
significant difference when comparing the 2 clinical groups to each other, t(39.85) =
0.000, p > 0.025. The post hoc comparisons were carried out using SPSS which
automatically corrects for multiple comparisons using a Bonferroni adjustment. In all
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post hoc comparisons carried out the increased likelihood of Type 1 error was
therefore controlled for.
A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of group on the Expression
Suppression subscale, F(2,60) = 2.158, p > 0.05.
3.3.1.2. ERQ-2 subscales
The ERQ-2 is based on a model of emotion regulation which categorises emotion
regulation strategies as functional or dysfunctional (in relation to acceptance or
rejection of emotional state) and as an internal regulatory strategy (e.g. cognitive
change) or an external regulatory strategy (e.g. environmental change). The total
scores for the Internal-Dysfunctional, Internal-Functional and External-
Dysfunctional subscales are based on summing the scores for 5 items each and the
possible range of scoring is 5-25 (higher scores indicating greater use of each
strategy). The total score for the External-Functional subscale is based on summing
the scores for 6 items and the possible range of scoring is 6-30 (higher scores
indicating greater use of this strategy). Descriptive statistics for total scores on the
Internal-Dysfunctional, Internal-Functional, External-Dysfunctional and External-
Functional subscales of the ERQ-2 are presented in appendix 7.
As illustrated in Figure 3.2 the group mean total scores show a difference in the
predicted direction for the Internal-Dysfunctional and Internal-Functional subscales
with the 2 clinical groups scoring similar to each other and different to the healthy
volunteers. The group mean total scores of the External Dysfunctional subscale do
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not show a difference in the predicted direction, while the group mean total scores of
the External-Functional subscale show a trend towards the predicted direction.
Figure 3.2 Mean scores on ERO-2 Internal-Dysfunctional, Internal-Functional,




Internal Dysfunctional Internal Functional External Dysfunctional
Emotion Regulation Strategy
External Functional
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group on the Internal-
Dysfunctional subscale, F(2,60) = 37.517, p < 0.05. In order to determine where this
main effect lay post hoc contrast t-tests were carried out and found a significant
difference when comparing the 2 clinical groups together to the healthy volunteers,
r(60) = 8.661, p < 0.025, with no significant difference when comparing the 2
clinical groups to each other, t(60) = -0.115, p > 0.025.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group on the Internal-
Functional subscale, F(2,60) = 4.861, p < 0.05. In order to determine where the main
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effect lay post hoc contrast t-tests were carried out and found a significant difference
when comparing the 2 clinical groups together to the healthy volunteers, /(60) = -
3.009, p < 0.025, with no significant difference when comparing the 2 clinical
groups to each other, t(60) = -0.816, p > 0.025.
A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of group on the External-
Dysfunctional subscale, F(2,60) = 2.611, p > 0.05.
A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of group on the External-
Functional subscale, F(2,60) = 1.383, p > 0.05. (The 19 item version of the ERQ-2
contains 4 items for the External-Functional subscale, analysis of these 4 items
yielded a similar result with no significant main effect, F(2,60) = 2.255, p > 0.05).
3.3.1.3. Implications of analyses for Hypothesis 1
Significant differences were found between the mean scores of the clinical and
healthy volunteers groups on a number of emotion regulation subscales (Cognitive
Reappraisal, Internal-Dysfunctional and Internal-Functional). The results of the ERQ
suggest that the healthy volunteers were more likely to regulate their emotions
through Cognitive Reappraisal (such as thinking about the situation in a different
way) than the clinical groups. No significant differences were found between the
groups on Expressive Suppression (suggesting that the groups were equally as likely
to endorse strategies such as keeping their emotions to themselves).
With regard to the ERQ-2 results the clinical groups were found to score
significantly different to the healthy volunteers on Internal-Dysfunctional and
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Internal Functional emotion regulation strategies (while not significantly different to
each other) suggesting that the clinical groups used higher levels of Internal-
Dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies (such as dwelling on their thoughts and
feelings) and lower levels of Internal-Functional emotion regulation strategies (such
as reviewing their thoughts of beliefs) . No significant differences were found
between the groups on External-Dysfunctional or External-Functional emotion
regulation strategies.
As such the results of the ERQ and ERQ-2 provide partial support for Hypothesis 1,
which predicts that the clinical groups will attempt to regulate their emotions in a
similar way, which will be different from healthy volunteers. In particular it was
found that the clinical groups used higher levels of maladaptive emotion regulation
strategies and lower levels of adaptive emotion regulation strategies than the healthy
volunteers.
3.3.2. Hypothesis 2:
The current emotional state of individuals who experience psychosis will be similar
to that of those who have an anxiety/mood disorder who have not experienced
psychosis and that this will differ from healthy volunteers.
Scores on the 'last week' subscale of the Basic Emotions Scale (BES) will be used to
assess hypothesis 2.
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The BES measures the experience of five 'basic' emotions over the last week and in
general, the scores for each of the five 'basic' emotions can be summed to provide an
overall emotionality score. Higher scores for each of the emotions and overall
emotionality indicate greater experiences of the emotions.
Descriptive statistics for total scores on the 'last week' overall emotionality, anger,
sadness, disgust, fear and happiness subscales of the BES are presented in appendix
7. The total scores for the anger, sadness, disgust, fear and happiness subscales are
based on summing the scores for 4 items each and the possible range of scoring is 4-
28. The overall emotionality total score is based on summing the 5 subscales (all 20
items) and the possible range of scoring is 20-140.
3.3.2.1. BES 'last week' overall emotionality subscale
As illustrated in Figure 3.3 the group mean total scores show a difference in the
predicted direction for the 'last week' overall emotionality subscale of the BES with
the 2 clinical groups scoring similar to each other and slightly higher than the healthy
volunteers.
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A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group on the 'last week'
overall emotionality subscale, F(2,60) = 5.184, p < 0.05. In order to determine where
this main effect lay post hoc contrast t-tests were carried out and found a significant
difference when comparing the 2 clinical groups together to the healthy volunteers,
r(60) = 2.944, p < 0.025, with no significant difference when comparing the 2
clinical groups to each other, t(60) = -1.304, p > 0.025.
3.3.2.2. BES 'last week' emotion subscales
As illustrated in Figure 3.4 the group mean total scores show a difference in the
predicted direction for the 'last week' sadness, disgust, fear and happiness subscales
of the BES with the 2 clinical groups scoring similar to each other and different to
the healthy volunteers. The 3 groups appeared to have experienced similar current
levels of anger.
psychosis anxiety/mood disorder healthy volunteer
Group
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Figure 3.4 Mean scores on BES 'last week' anger, sadness, disgust fear and





A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of group on the 'last week'
anger subscale, F(2,60) = 0.348, p > 0.05.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group on the 'last week'
sadness subscale, F(2,60) = 8.505, p < 0.05. In order to determine where this main
effect lay post hoc contrast t-tests were carried out and found a significant difference
when comparing the 2 clinical groups together to the healthy volunteers, /(54.924) =
4.796, p < 0.025, with no significant difference when comparing the 2 clinical
groups to each other, r(38.815) = -0.282, p > 0.025.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group on the 'last week'
disgust subscale, F(2,60) = 5.694, p < 0.05. In order to determine where this main
effect lay post hoc contrast t-tests were carried out and found a significant difference
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when comparing the 2 clinical groups together to the healthy volunteers, 1(58.686) =
4.048, p < 0.025, with no significant difference when comparing the 2 clinical
groups to each other, 1(39.014) = -0.760, p > 0.025.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group on the 'last week'
fear subscale, F{2,60) = 13.445, p < 0.05. In order to determine where this main
effect lay post hoc contrast t-tests were carried out and found a significant difference
when comparing the 2 clinical groups together to the healthy volunteers, 1(60) =
5.120, p < 0.025, with no significant difference when comparing the 2 clinical
groups to each other, 1(60) = -0.823, p > 0.025.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group on the 'last week'
happiness subscale, F(2,60) = 13.613, p < 0.05. In order to determine where this
main effect lay post hoc contrast t-tests were carried out and found a significant
difference when comparing the 2 clinical groups together to the healthy volunteers,
1(55.873) = -5.658, p < 0.025, with no significant difference when comparing the 2
clinical groups to each other, 1(39.792) = -1.505, p > 0.025.
3.3.2.3. Implications of analyses for Hypothesis 2
Significant differences were found between the mean scores of the clinical and
healthy volunteers groups on 'last week' overall emotionality, with the 2 clinical
groups scoring similarly to each other and significantly different from the healthy
volunteer group (as expected the clinical groups showed greater overall levels of
emotionality).
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Further comparisons found that the clinical groups scored similarly to each other and
significantly different from healthy volunteers on 'last week' sadness, disgust and
fear, where the clinical groups reported greater experiences of these emotions, and on
happiness, where the clinical groups reported experiencing this emotion less often.
The groups were not found to experience significantly different levels of anger.
As such the results of the BES 'last week' subscales support Hypothesis 2 (with the
exception of anger), which predicts that the current emotional experience of
individuals who experience psychosis will be similar to that of those with an
anxiety/mood disorder and that this will differ from healthy volunteers.
3.3.3. Hypothesis 3:
The general emotional state of individuals who experience psychosis will be similar
to that of those who have an anxiety/mood disorder who have not experienced
psychosis and that this will differ from healthy volunteers.
Scores on the 'in general' subscale of the Basic Emotions Scale will be used to assess
hypothesis 3.
Descriptive statistics for total scores on the 'in general' overall emotionality, anger,
sadness, disgust, fear and happiness subscales of the BES are presented in appendix
7. The total scores for the 'in general' subscales are derived in the same way as the
'last week' subscales.
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3.3.3.1 BES 'in general' overall emotionality subscale
As illustrated in Figure 3.5 the group mean total scores show a difference in the
predicted direction for the 'in general' overall emotionality subscale of the BES with
the 2 clinical groups scoring similar to each other and slightly higher than the healthy
volunteers.
Figure 3.5 Mean scores on BES 'in general' overall emotionality subscale for the 3
groups
psychosis anxiety/mood disorder healthy volunteer
Group
As noted in section 3.2 females in the anxiety/mood disorder group were found to
score higher than males on the 'in general' overall emotionality subscale of the BES.
Gender was therefore controlled for in a one-way ANCOVA analysis of this variable
and was found to have no significant main effect, F(l,59) = 2.441, p > 0.05, while
group was found to have a significant main effect, F(2,59) = 8.647, p < 0.05. A one¬
way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group on the 'in general' overall
emotionality subscale, F(2,60) = 10.301, p < 0.05. In order to determine whether the
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significant main effect in group lay post hoc contrast t-tests were carried out, they
found a significant difference when comparing the 2 clinical groups together to the
healthy volunteers, t(60) = 4.393, p < 0.025, with no significant difference when
comparing the 2 clinical groups to each other, t(60) = -1.140, p > 0.025.
3.3.3.2. BES 'in general' emotion subscales
As illustrated in Figure 3.6 the group mean total scores show a difference in the
predicted direction for the 'in general' anger, sadness, disgust, fear and happiness
subscales of the BES with the 2 clinical groups scoring similar to each other and
different to the healthy volunteers. The 3 groups appeared to have experienced
similar current levels of anger.
Figure 3.6 Mean scores on BES 'in general' anger, sadness, disgust, fear and
happiness subscales for the 3 groups
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A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of group on the 'in general'
anger subscale, F(2,60) = 2.140, p > 0.05.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group on the 'in general'
sadness subscale, F(2,60) = 17.107, p < 0.05. In order to determine where this main
effect lay post hoc contrast t-tests were carried out and found a significant difference
when comparing the 2 clinical groups together to the healthy volunteers, t(60) =
5.848, p < 0.025, with no significant difference when comparing the 2 clinical
groups to each other, t(38.815) = -0.140, p > 0.025.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group on the 'in general'
disgust subscale, F(2,60) = 6.506, p < 0.05. In order to determine where this main
effect lay post hoc contrast t-tests were carried out and found a significant difference
when comparing the 2 clinical groups together to the healthy volunteers, t(57.525) =
4.503, p < 0.025, with no significant difference when comparing the 2 clinical
groups to each other, t(39.916) = 0.487, p > 0.025.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group on the 'in general'
fear subscale, F(2,60) = 25.264, p < 0.05. In order to determine where this main
effect lay post hoc contrast t-tests were carried out and found a significant difference
when comparing the 2 clinical groups together to the healthy volunteers, t(60) =
7.087, p < 0.025, with no significant difference when comparing the 2 clinical
groups to each other, t{60) = -0.553, p > 0.025.
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A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group on the 'in general'
happiness subscale, F(2,60) = 15.409, p < 0.05. In order to determine where this
main effect lay post hoc contrast t-tests were carried out and found a significant
difference when comparing the 2 clinical groups together to the healthy volunteers,
t(60) = -5.351, p < 0.025, with no significant difference when comparing the 2
clinical groups to each other, t(60) = -1.478, p > 0.025.
3.3.3.3. Implications of analyses for Hypothesis 3
Significant differences were found between the mean scores of the clinical and
healthy volunteer groups on 'in general' overall emotionality with the 2 clinical
groups scoring similarly to each other and significantly different from the healthy
volunteer group (as expected the clinical groups showed greater overall levels of
emotionality).
Further comparisons found that the clinical groups scored similarly to each other and
significantly different from healthy volunteers on 'in general' sadness, disgust and
fear, where the clinical groups reported greater experiences of these emotions. This
was also found to be the case for happiness, where the clinical groups reported
experiencing this emotion less often.
As such the results of the BES 'in general' subscales support Hypothesis 3 which
predicts that the general emotional experience of individuals who experience
psychosis will be similar to that of those with an anxiety/mood disorder and that this
will differ from healthy volunteers.
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3.3.4. Hypothesis 4:
Individuals who experience psychosis will use similar coping strategies as
individuals with an anxiety/mood disorder who have not experienced psychosis and
that this will differ from healthy volunteers.
Scores on the Brief COPE will be used to assess hypothesis 4.
The Brief COPE is a questionnaire designed to assess the use of 14 theoretically
derived coping strategies. The scales of the Brief COPE can be grouped into
Adaptive and Maladaptive scales; and Emotion-Focussed and Problem-Focussed
scales. For the purposes of this study it was considered to be most appropriate to
analyse data for the 4 grouped scales as opposed to all 14 subscales. Higher scores on
each of the scales reflect greater use of the coping strategies related to that scale.
3.3.4.1. Brief COPE Adaptive and Maladaptive subscales
Descriptive statistics for total scores on the Adaptive and Maladaptive subscales of
the Brief COPE are presented in appendix 7. The total score for the Adaptive
subscale is based on summing the scores for 16 items and the possible range of
scoring is 16-64. The total score for the Maladaptive subscale is based on summing
the scores for 12 items and the possible range of scoring is 12-48.
As illustrated in Figure 3.7 the group mean total scores show a difference in the
predicted direction with the 2 clinical groups scoring similar to each other and
different to the healthy volunteers for both Adaptive and Maladaptive subscales.
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A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of group on the Adaptive
subscale, F(2,60) = 1.515, p > 0.05. A one-way ANOVA did however reveal a
significant main effect of group on the Maladaptive subscale, F(2,60) = 13.962, p <
0.05. In order to determine where this main effect lay post hoc contrast t-tests were
carried out and found a significant difference when comparing the 2 clinical groups
together to the healthy volunteers, t(60) — 5.238, p < 0.025, with no significant
difference when comparing the 2 clinical groups to each other, t(60) = -0.698, p >
0.025.
3.3.4.2. Brief COPE Problem-Focussed and Emotion-Focussed subscales
Descriptive statistics for total scores on the Problem-Focussed and Emotion-
Focussed subscales of the Brief COPE are presented in appendix 7. Tlie total scores
for the Problem-Focussed and Emotion-Focussed subscales are based on summing
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the scores for 3 scales each and the possible range of scoring for each subscale is 6-
24.
As illustrated in Figure 3.8 the group mean total scores show a difference in the
predicted direction with the 2 clinical groups scoring similar to each other and
different to the healthy volunteers for the Problem-Focussed subscale, although there
is less of a difference between the groups on the Emotion-Focussed subscale.
Figure 3.8 Mean scores on Brief COPE Problem-Focussed and Emotion-Focussed
subscales for the 3 groups.
□ anxiety/mood disorder
□ healthy volunteer
Problem Focussed Emotion Focussed
Coping Strategies
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group on the Problem-
Focussed subscale, F(2,60) = 4.494, p < 0.05. In order to determine where this main
effect lay post hoc contrast t-tests were carried out and found a significant difference
when comparing the 2 clinical groups together to the healthy volunteers, t(60) = -
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2.982, p < 0.025, with no significant difference when comparing the 2 clinical
groups to each other, t(60) = -0.310, p > 0.025.
A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of group on the Emotion-
Focussed subscale, F(2,60) = 1.189, p > 0.05.
3.3.4.3. Implications of analyses for Hypothesis 4
Significant differences were found between the mean scores of the clinical and
healthy volunteer groups on the Maladaptive and Problem-Focussed subscales with
the 2 clinical groups scoring similarly to each other and significantly different from
the healthy volunteer group (with the clinical groups showing greater levels of
Maladaptive coping and lower levels of Problem-Focussed coping than the healthy
volunteer group). No significant differences were found between the groups on
Adaptive coping or Emotion-Focussed coping.
As such the results of the Brief COPE provide partial support for Hypothesis 4 (in
the case of Maladaptive and Problem-Focussed coping), which predicts individuals
who experience psychosis will use similar coping strategies as individuals with an
anxiety/mood disorder who have not experienced psychosis and that this will differ
from healthy volunteers. However the results for Adaptive and Emotion-Focussed
coping do not support Hypothesis 4.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
4.1. Summary of findings
The main aim of this study was to investigate emotion regulation in psychosis. This
was carried out in order to create a greater understanding of emotion regulation in
psychosis given the dearth of research in this area. It was hypothesised that emotion
regulation in psychosis would be similar to emotion regulation in anxiety/mood
disorders and that this would differ from the general population. This hypothesis was
partially supported by the ERQ results in that, as expected, Cognitive Reappraisal
was found to be similar in the 2 clinical groups and significantly different from
healthy volunteers. In particular it was found that the clinical groups were less likely
than the healthy volunteers to think about situations differently in order to alter their
emotional impact. No significant difference was found between the groups with
regard to Expressive Suppression, suggesting that the clinical groups and healthy
volunteers were equally likely to endorse items such as 'I keep my emotions to
myself. The results of the ERQ show that individuals who experience psychosis and
individuals with an anxiety/mood disorder use less Cognitive Reappraisal strategies
(such as thinking differently about the situation they are in) to regulate their emotions
than healthy volunteers
An interesting finding of this study was that males who had experienced psychosis
scored significantly higher than females who had experienced psychosis on
Cognitive Reappraisal. It is not possible to determine from this study whether this
would be a consistent finding relating to gender differences in emotion regulation in
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psychosis or whether this finding is specific to the sample being investigated and
therefore further research would need to be carried out.
The results of the ERQ-2 subscales also relate to the first hypothesis. The results of
the internal subscales support the hypothesis in that, as expected, both Internal-
Dysfunctional and Internal-Functional emotion regulation strategies were found to be
used to a similar extent by the 2 clinical groups and significantly different to the
healthy volunteers. In particular the clinical groups reported using more Internal-
Dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies, such as dwelling on their thoughts and
feelings, than the healthy volunteers. Meanwhile the healthy volunteers reported
using significantly more Internal-Functional emotion regulation strategies, such as
reviewing their thoughts or beliefs, than the clinical groups.
The results of the external subscales of the ERQ-2 do not support the first hypothesis
as no significant differences were found between the groups on External-
Dysfunctional and External-Functional emotion regulation strategies. The finding of
similar amounts of external emotion regulation strategies in the clinical groups and
healthy volunteers may reflect an important aspect of the sample chosen for this
study. Both clinical groups were engaged with services and were receiving ongoing
psychological input, this input may focus on and promote External-Functional
emotion regulation strategies such as seeking support or advice from others. The
mean scores for the 3 groups on External-Dysfunctional emotion regulation
strategies were close to the minimum score available on this subscale suggesting that
none of the groups tended to use External-Dysfunctional strategies.
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The results of the ERQ-2 suggests that individuals who experience psychosis and
individuals with an anxiety/mood disorder have similar difficulties with the internal
regulation of emotions in that the clinical groups scored higher on Internal-
Dysfunctional and lower on Internal-Functional emotion regulation strategies than
the healthy volunteers.
The finding of higher levels of Internal-Dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies
in the clinical groups in comparison with the healthy volunteers may be related to
Ellring and Smith's (1998) proposal that psychosis is characterised by an affective
regulation system which is focused on internal regulation. Although interestingly the
psychosis group's mean scores for Internal-Dysfunctional and External Functional
emotion regulation strategies are the same, suggesting that this group is able to make
use of external resources for the regulation of their emotions. As noted earlier it may
be that this group has developed these external strategies through their psychological
input and it would be worthwhile to further investigate this possibility in future
research perhaps by comparing groups pre and post intervention.
A further aim of this study was to investigate the emotional experience of individuals
who experience psychosis. This was carried out in order to better understand
emotional experience in psychosis given the historical Kraepelinian divide between
neuroses and psychoses (Birchwood, 2004) and limited amount of research in this
area. It was hypothesised that the current and general emotional state of individuals
who experienced psychosis would be similar to that of those with an anxiety/mood
disorder and that this would differ from healthy volunteers. This hypothesis was
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supported by the BES 'last week' and 'in general' scales in that, as expected, the 2
clinical groups rated themselves as experiencing similar levels of emotions,
significantly different to healthy volunteers (with the exception of the 'last week'
anger subscale in which no significant difference was found between the groups). In
particular the clinical groups reported experiencing greater amounts ofwhat could be
considered negative emotions (sadness, fear and disgust) than the healthy volunteers.
They also reported experiencing happiness less often that the healthy volunteers.
An interesting finding of this study was that females with an anxiety/mood disorder
were found to experience higher levels 'in general' of overall emotionality than
males with an anxiety/mood disorder. It is not possible to determine from this study
whether this would be a consistent finding relating to gender differences in overall
emotionality in anxiety/mood disorder or whether this finding is specific to the
sample being investigated. Given that this gender difference was not found in 'last
week' overall emotionality it may suggest that this finding would not be consistent
across samples.
The results of the BES suggests that individuals who experience psychosis and
individuals with an anxiety/mood disorder experience similar levels of overall
emotionality, as well as similar levels of what could be considered positive and
negative emotions. The results of this study, alongside previous research (i.e. Suslow
et al., 2003; van Os et ah, 2000; Freeman and Garety, 2003) into the emotional
experience of individuals who have experienced psychosis suggests that these
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individuals experience a wide range of emotions and that these should be taken into
consideration when developing theoretical and treatment models of psychosis.
An interesting finding from the BES is that the emotion experienced most often in
both the clinical groups was fear, given the mixed presentation in both the clinical
groups one may have expected similar levels of emotions, such as sadness and fear.
If this is found in future studies it would suggest that fear could be an important
emotion to consider when working with a variety of clinical groups, where it may
have been considered to be most important to consider in anxiety disorders.
The final aim of this study was to investigate the use of coping strategies in
psychosis in comparison with anxiety/mood disorders and healthy volunteers. It was
hypothesised that individuals with psychosis would use similar coping strategies to
individuals with an anxiety/mood disorder and that this would differ from healthy
volunteers. This hypothesis was supported, to some extent, by the results of the Brief
COPE. The 2 clinical groups were found to use similar levels ofMaladaptive coping,
significantly greater than the healthy volunteers. With regard to Adaptive coping, no
significant differences were found between the groups. Healthy volunteers were
found to use significantly higher levels of Problem Focussed coping strategies than
the clinical groups, while no significant differences were found in relation to
Emotion Focussed coping. The finding of reduced levels of Problem Focussed
coping strategies in the clinical groups and greater levels of Maladaptive coping
reflect findings from previous studies (e.g. Van den Bosch et ah, 1992, Horan and
Blanchard, 2003).
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Overall the results from this study appear to fit together as would be expected. In
general the clinical groups were found to use higher levels of less adaptive emotion
regulation strategies than the healthy volunteers and experienced greater levels of
emotionality and what could be conceptualised as negative emotions, alongside using
less problem-focussed coping strategies and more maladaptive coping strategies than
the healthy volunteers. The results suggest that more emphasis and importance
should be placed upon emotional dysfunction and regulation than is currently the
case in psychosis.
4.2. Clinical implications of findings
On the basis of this study alone it is difficult to extract broader clinical implications
however, as further research is carried out into emotion regulation it is anticipated
that significant contributions may be made towards clinical work with individuals
with psychosis. The enhancement of emotion regulation skills is likely to be
embedded in many therapeutic approaches for mental health problems, although this
may be considered somewhat implicit. In the case of psychosis emphasis may be
placed more on psychotic symptoms and less on emotion dysfunction than may be
the case in other clinical groups given the historical lack of emphasis on emotional
dysfunction in this group.
While more research is required in order to clarify and validate the key findings of
this study a number of clinical implications can be identified. These would include
the importance of assessing emotion regulation strategies and considering the
implications of these for therapy, paying greater attention to the role of emotional
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dysregulation in the formation, maintenance and course of psychosis, identifying
beliefs about emotion regulation and challenging these where they may be unhelpful
and enhancing emotion regulation skills. Individuals for whom emotional regulation
is particularly difficult may benefit from a therapeutic approach which places
emotional functioning and the development of emotion regulation skills at its core.
The implication of an emotion regulation approach to psychosis would suggest that
instead of focussing on symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations, as outlined in
most textbooks (e.g. Morrison, 2002), the focus should be on emotional dysfunction,
perhaps focussing on the 5 basic emotions proposed by Power (in press). This
approach would be characterised by honing in on emotional dysfunction as opposed
to psychotic symptomatology. The aim of psychological interventions for psychosis
such as cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) is to reduce psychotic symptoms in
order to reduce the distress which accompanies them, however no consistent effect
has been found on emotional dysfunction using CBT for psychosis (Birchwood,
2003), suggesting that changing the focus of treatment to emotional dysfunction may
prove more fruitful. Bach and Hayes (2002) suggest that the focus of therapy could
be less on the psychotic processes and more on the accompanying feelings of failure,
depression and anxiety.
The finding that individuals who experience psychosis experience greater difficulty
with the internal regulation of their emotions would suggest that therapeutic
approaches should focus on developing functional internal emotion regulation
strategies. This approach might be characterised by the development of self-soothing
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techniques and mindfulness (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) as well as strategies already used in
many cognitive-behavioural therapies such as relaxation. In the current study
individuals who experienced psychosis were not found to be significantly different to
healthy volunteers with regard to external emotion regulation strategies. This could
possibly be due to them already being involved with services and having developed
these strategies as part of the therapeutic process. If further research found that
individuals who experience psychosis differed to healthy volunteers with regard to
their use of external emotion regulation strategies prior to psychological intervention
this would suggest that it would be important to continue to work on developing
external emotion regulation strategies alongside internal strategies.
4.3. Theoretical implications of findings
As with the clinical implications it is difficult to extract definitive theoretical
implications on the basis of this study alone however, as further research is carried
out into emotion regulation it is anticipated that significant contributions may be
made towards understanding the role of emotional disturbance in the development,
maintenance and course ofpsychosis.
While more research is required in order to clarify and validate the key findings of
this study a number of theoretical implications can be proposed. In relation to current
theories of psychosis difficulties with emotion regulation can be seen to be related to
symptoms ofpsychosis. For example Bentall (1990) suggests that hallucinations may
represent cognitive biases which are reinforced through reduction in anxiety. These
cognitive biases could be considered as emotion regulation strategies in that they
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serve an anxiety reducing function. The finding that individuals with psychosis use
significantly more Internal-Dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies than healthy
volunteers may fit with the cognitive biases described by Bentall, however more
research directly assessing this proposal needs to be carried out.
Morrison (1998) offers an understanding of hallucinations based on Clark's (1986)
model of panic disorder. This model places the use of safety seeking behaviours at
the core of the maintenance of hallucinations. Safety seeking behaviours could be
considered emotion regulation strategies as they are employed in order to reduce
feelings of anxiety. The findings of this study did not identify External-
Dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies as more problematic for the psychosis
group however if future studies found difficulties with external emotion regulation
these may fit with a model which includes safety seeking behaviour as a maintaining
factor. Freeman, Garety and Kuipers (2001) also identify safety seeking behaviours
as important in the maintenance of delusions, which could be related to emotion
regulation in a similar fashion to hallucinations.
The finding that individuals with psychosis were less likely to employ Cognitive
Reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy may be linked with the studies
investigating reasoning biases in psychosis. Dudley, John, Young and Over (1997)
found that individuals who experienced psychosis were more likely to jump to
conclusions based on limited information, in relation to emotional regulation this
may be reflected by a lack of Cognitive Reappraisal in this group. An interesting
finding of the Dudley et al. (1997) study was that when provided with greater
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amounts of evidence the individuals with psychosis were willing to change their
conclusions, perhaps suggesting that if jumping to conclusions is related to emotion
regulation style then individuals with psychosis may be helped therapeutically by
increasing their ability to use Cognitive-Reappraisal through cognitive therapy
techniques such as evidence gathering.
It would appear that the concept of emotion regulation can be considered alongside
many of the concepts discussed by cognitive theorists, such as safety seeking
behaviours and cognitive biases related to psychosis. Emotion regulation can also be
seen to be closely linked with concepts discussed by psychoanalysts. The concept of
'splitting off negatively valenced emotions and projecting them on to the external
world, described by Frosch (1983) and Klein (1946/86), can be seen to serve an
emotion regulatory function. Psychoanalysts view defence mechanisms characteristic
of early childhood as responsible for psychotic experiences such as hallucinations
and delusions. This proposal fits well with emotion regulation theories which view
the development of emotion regulation as starting early in childhood and consider
that an individual develops a stable emotion regulation style through their caregiving
experiences (Thomson, 1994; Calkins, 1994).
4.4. Areas for further research
The key findings of this research require replication in order to be confident that the
differences found would also be evident in other samples. In particular it would be
beneficial to determine whether the gender differences found in Cognitive
Reappraisal in psychosis are specific to this sample or a more widespread finding.
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Given the early stage of knowledge of emotion regulation there is much is that is still
to be understood in the general population as well as in clinical populations.
The measures of emotion regulation chosen for this study were only recently
developed and no published research was identified which reported on their use with
individuals who had experienced psychosis. Future research into emotion regulation
would benefit from the validation of and further development of emotion regulation
measures with the general as well as clinical populations.
If future research establishes links between emotion regulation and psychosis, this
would lead to the critical question of whether difficulties with emotion regulation
precede the onset of and can be considered vulnerability factors of psychosis. This
question would need to be addressed by a prospective research design. Longitudinal
research may also contribute to understanding whether particular styles of emotion
regulation influence specific difficulties.
Future research may also consider investigating links between the pathways
proposed by Birchwood (2003) to emotional dysfunction in psychosis and emotion
regulation. Birchwood (2003) suggests that emotional disorders in psychosis may
develop as a reaction to the psychosis itself or from developmental disturbance
triggered by childhood trauma or emerging psychosis or both. It may be useful to
determine whether individuals in each of the pathways attempt to regulate their
emotions in similar or different ways as this is likely to have implications for the
treatment of emotional dysregulation in these individuals. In the first pathway
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whereby emotional disturbance arises as a reaction to the psychosis, emotion
regulation strategies may be characterised by a lack of cognitive reappraisal as it is
the individual's attributions about their psychosis which is at the core of their
emotional disturbance. If this were found to be the case treatments for these
individuals would be most appropriately aimed at helping them to develop more
functional reappraisal strategies. In the second pathway whereby emotional
disturbance arises as a result of developmental trauma, emotion regulation strategies
may be characterised by dysfunctional internal or external emotion regulation styles
related to the individuals dysfunctional schema development. If this were found to be
the case treatments for these individuals would be most appropriately aimed at
schema level work.
In relation to this particular piece of research it would be worthwhile to replicate
these findings with larger groups, matched for age and gender, to validate the key
findings of the present study. In terms of the measures used it will be important to
validate the ERQ-2 and the BES for use with psychiatric populations.
During the recruitment of participants for this study a number of comments were
made by individuals about their beliefs about emotions and whether they are within
our control. An interesting aside from the focus of this research would be to develop
a qualitative research methodology to investigate the beliefs of individuals who
experience psychosis about their ability to regulate their emotions. Geekie's (2004)
research, based on grounded theory, identified emotional experience as an important
aspect of psychosis for the participants involved in his research and highlighted
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'overwhelming emotional arousal' (Geekie, 2004: 154) as of particular significance,
suggesting that some of the participants in his study may have felt they had little
control over their emotional arousal. Beliefs about controllability of emotions are
likely to play an important role in emotion regulation attempts and may offer insights
into the internal working models of emotions in this group. This approach may be
particularly useful given the early stage of our knowledge in this area.
4.5. Critique of the study design
The cross-sectional design of this study means that it is not possible to reliably
establish the direction of any causal relationships between the variables. For
example, it is not possible to determine whether differences in emotion regulation
represent a vulnerability to developing psychosis or an anxiety/mood disorder, or
whether these differences develop alongside mental health difficulties.
The nature of this research project would not allow for a longitudinal design.
However, given the lack of research in the area of emotion regulation, an
investigative approach to begin to explore emotion regulation in clinical populations
can be considered worthwhile. In the longer term research into emotion regulation in
mental health would benefit from prospective research taking a developmental
psychopathology approach whereby vulnerability factors, such as emotion regulation
strategies, could be assessed over the long term to determine whether there is any
association with later mental health difficulties.
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The psychosis and anxiety/mood disorder groups in this study were comprised of
significantly different ratios of male to females. One explanation for this gender
difference may be that it is a reflection of different rates of diagnosis for the sexes,
with more males being diagnosed with some form of psychosis, and more females
being diagnosed with anxiety/mood disorders (Read, 2004c). In light of the
significant group differences in gender composition, which have made the
interpretation of some of the findings more difficult, future studies would benefit
from attempting to ensure a closer ratio ofmales to females in both groups.
The recruitment of participants from Clinical Psychologists' caseloads offers both
benefits and potential for bias. Some of the benefits include that individuals were not
unnecessarily burdened where there was good contra-indications to inviting them to
participate in this study and that the sample is likely to be reflective of individuals
who are attending psychology departments. However, psychologists may have
tended to select individuals who they believed were most likely to take part and been
more conservative in other cases and so the sample may be shaped by clinicians'
views on appropriate participants. This possibility was kept to a minimum by the
provision of clear guidance regarding exclusion and inclusion criteria and by regular
contact between the investigator and the referring clinicians.
Another aspect relating to the clinical samples is that they are likely to be biased
towards individuals who are actively engaged with and regularly attending
psychology appointments and who are willing to share and reflect upon their
emotional experiences. This sample may therefore represent a particular subgroup of
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individuals with mental health problems. However given the early stage of research
in this area it seems appropriate to develop understandings with those who are most
able and willing to reflect upon their experiences with the hope of expanding the
research to other samples in the future. Future research would benefit from including
individuals who are not engaged in psychological therapy to determine whether there
are any differences between these groups, it would also be useful to assess a sample
of individuals who are not currently engaged with psychiatric services in general,
although they are likely to be more difficult to identify and recruit.
An important consideration in this study was the measures used to assess emotion
regulation, emotional experience and coping strategies. The use of self-report
measures relies to a large extent on the awareness of the individual concerned
regarding the concept in question. Given the nature of the processes in emotion
regulation it is likely that they are not all carried out with full awareness and may be
considered to be relatively non-conscious. For example some individuals may not
always be fully aware that by suppressing the expression of their emotions they are
impacting on the regulation of their emotions. The reliance on self-report may
therefore reduce the accuracy of the assessment of emotion regulation strategies,
however at the current time there are no available alternatives.
Research into the development of emotion regulation in children has often utilised
observational paradigms similar to those used in attachment research (Thomson,
1994). For the purposes of this study it was not considered feasible to utilise this
approach as the situations used with children would have had to have been heavily
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modified for use with an adult population. Furthermore, in order to use observations
as a method of assessing emotion regulation in this study, one would have to have a
very clear understanding of typical behavioural correlates of emotion regulation
strategies and this level of understanding has not yet been reached (Gross, 1999).
4.6. Conclusions
The findings of this study provide support for a continuum model of mental health
whereby psychosis can be understood alongside other mental health problems such
as anxiety and depression. The significant differences found between the clinical
groups and the healthy volunteers but not between the 2 clinical groups suggest that
psychotic and neurotic disorders may be more similar than traditionally thought.
This study suggests that emotional regulation should be considered as an important
factor in understanding the development, maintenance and course of mental health
difficulties, including psychosis, and that treatment should therefore focus on
emotional dysfunction and regulation as opposed to focussing solely on psychotic
symptoms.
Given the early stages of understanding of emotion regulation in non-clinical as well
as clinical populations a great deal of exploration and research is still required.
Potential areas for future development have been identified, including addressing
some of the shortcomings of this study. Although this initial study has found
evidence of difficulties with the regulation of emotions in psychosis further research
needs to be carried out in order to validate these findings and to determine whether
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the gender difference found in Cognitive Reappraisal in the psychosis group is
consistent in other samples. The complexity and accessibility of some of the
constructs relating to emotional regulation and the relatively early stages of
understanding in this area in general pose challenges to carrying out research in this
area. Nonetheless developing a better understanding of emotional experience and
regulation in psychosis may provide valuable insights into the development,
maintenance and course of psychosis, which could allow for further developments of
treatment approaches with this client group.
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If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving any reason.
What do I have to do?
You will be asked to fill in some questionnaires, which look at the way you have been feeling, how
you cope with your feelings and how you cope with day to day life stressors. Our meeting will last
approximately 1 hour. We can meet where you normally meet with your psychologist or at your
home, whichever is most convenient to you.
Results of the research:
This study will run for the first 6 months of the year 2006. All information will be entirely
confidential. Only properly authorised persons (e.g. your psychiatrist) may have access to this
information. Your GP will also be informed of your participation in the study and about the nature
of the research.
In. due course, it will be possible for you to see the results of this research of you wish to do so
(these will not include individual findings, but the main results of the study).
You can contact me, Karen Livingstone (Tel: 0131 536 7604), Psychology Department, Rosslynlee
Hospital, Roslin, for further information. If you have any problems or concerns resulting from the
interview my supervisor, Dr Sean Harper, would be available to talk to on the above number.
Please ask if you have any questions
Thank you for your help
Divisional Headquarters:
St. Roque, Astley Ainslie Hospital, 133 Grange Loan, Edinburgh tH9 2HL
Divisional Chief Executive Murray Duncanson
NHS
Lothian
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Appendix 3: Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)
J. Gross and O. John (2003)
We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how you
control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. We are interested in two aspects of
your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, or what you feel like inside. The other
is your emotional expression, or how you show your emotions in the way you talk, gesture or
behave. Although some of the following questions may seem similar to one another, they
differ in important ways. For each item, please answer using the following scale.
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Disagree Agree
1. When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change
what I'm thinking about
2. I keep my emotions to myself
3. When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change what
I'm thinking about
4. When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them
5. When I am faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way
that helps me stay calm
6. I control my emotions by not expressing them
7. When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I'm thinking about the
situation
8. I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I am in
9. When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them
10. When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I'm thinking about the
situation
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Appendix 4: Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 2 (ERQ-2)
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 2
We all experience lots of different feelings or emotions. For example, different
things in our lives make us feel happy, sad, angry and so on...
The following questions ask you to think about how often you do certain things in
response to your emotions. You do not have to think about specific emotions but
just how often you generally do the things listed below.
Please tick the box corresponding to the answer that fits best. We all respond to our
emotions in different ways so there are no right or wrong answers.
^
In GENERAL how do vou
respond to youi emotions?
V y Never Seldom Often
Very
Often Always
1. I talk to someone about how I
feel O O O O O
2. I take my feelings out on others
verbally
(e.g. shouting, arguing)
O o o o o
3. I seek physical contact from
friends or family (e.g. a hug,
hold hands)
o o o o o
4. I review (rethink) my thoughts
or beliefs
o o o o o
5. I harm or punish myself in
some way
o o o o o
6. I do something energetic
(e.g. play sport, go for a walk)
o o o o o
7. I dwell on my thoughts and
feelings
(e.g. It goes round and round
in my head and I can't stop it)
o o o o o
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C ~\
In GENERAL how do you
respond to your emotions? Never Seldom Often
Very
Often Always
8. 1 ask others for advice o o o o o
9. 1 review (rethink) my goals or
plans
o o o o o
10.1 take my feelings out on others
physically
(e.g. fighting, lashing out)
o o o o o
11.1 put the situation into
perspective o o o o o
12.1 concentrate on a pleasant
activity
o o o o o
13.1 try to make others feel bad
(e.g. being rude, ignoring them)
o o o o o
14.1 think about people better off
and make myself feel worse o o o o o
15.1 keep the feeling locked up
inside o o o o o
16.1 plan what I could do better
next time o o o o o
17.1 bully other people
(e.g. saying nasty things to them, hitting
them)
o o o o o
18.1 take my feelings out on
objects around me
(e.g. deliberately causing damage to my
house, school or outdoor things)
o o o o o
19. Things feel unreal
(e.g. I feel strange, things
around me feel strange, I
davdreamt
o o o o o
20. I telephone friends or family o o o o o
21. I go out and do something nice
(e.g. cinema, shopping, go for
a meal, meet people)
o o o o o
Thank you for your help.
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Appendix 5: The Basic Emotions Scale
THE BASIC EMOTIONS SCALE
The purpose of this scale is to find out how much or how often you experience certain emotions and then to
ask some questions about how you feel actually during particular emotions themselves
The first part of the scale is designed to explore how you have felt DURING THE LASTWEEK.
For each emotion, please circle ONE number only between 1 and 7, to indicate how you have felt.
OVER THE LAST WEEK I HAVE FELT:
not at all some of
ANGER 1 2 3
DESPAIR 1 2 3
SHAME 1 2 3
ANXIETY 1 2 3
HAPPINESS 1 2 3
FRUSTRATION 1 2 3
MISERY 12 3
GUILT 1 2 3
NERVOUSNESS 1 2 3
JOY 1 2 3
IRRITATION 1 2 3
GLOOMINESS 1 2 3
HUMILIATED 1 2 3
TENSE 12 3
LOVING 1 2 3
AGGRESSION 1 2 3
MOURNFUL 1 2 3
BLAMEWORTHY 1 2 3
WORRIED 1 2 3
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In the second part of this questionnaire we would like to know about how you feel IN GENERAL.
This section asks about HOW OFTEN you feel the emotion
Again, for each emotion please circle ONE number only between 1 and 7, to indicate how you feel.
IN GENERAL, I FEEL THIS EMOTION:
never sometimes very often
ANGER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DESPAIR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHAME 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ANXIETY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HAPPINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FRUSTRATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MISERY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
GUILT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
NERVOUSNESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
JOY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IRRITATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
GLOOMINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HUMILIATED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TENSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
LOVING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AGGRESSION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MOURNFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BLAMEWORTHY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORRIED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CHEERFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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In the third part of this questionnaire we would like to ask you for some information about HOW WELL
YOU FEEL YOU COPE when you experience certain emotions. For example, you might feel completely out
of control of the emotion, or overwhelmed by the emotion in some other way.
Please note: even if you never experience a particular emotion please answer the question by imagining how
you think you would feel ifyou did experience that emotion.
Again, for each emotion, please circle ONE number only between 1 and 7, to indicate how well you feet you





ANGER 1 2 3 4 5 6
DESPAIR 1 2 3 4 5 6
SHAME 1 2 3 4 5 6
ANXIETY 1 2 3 4 5 6
HAPPINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6
FRUSTRATION 1 2 3 4 5 6
MISERY 1 2 3 4 5 6
GUILT 1 2 3 4 5 6
NERVOUSNESS 1 2 3 4 5 6
JOY 1 2 3 4 5 6
IRRITATION 1 2 3 4 5 6
GLOOMINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6
HUMILIATED 1 2 3 4 5 6
TENSE 1 2 3 4 5 6
LOVING 1 2 3 4 5 6
AGGRESSION 1 2 3 4 5 6
MOURNFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6
BLAMEWORTHY 1 2 3 4 5 6
WORRIED 1 2 3 4 5 6
CHEERFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6
Thank you very much for your help with this questionnaire
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Appendix 6: The BriefCOPE
The Brief COPE
C.S. Carver (1997)
fhese items deal with ways you cope with day to day life stressors. There are many ways to deal
vith stressors. These items ask what you usually do. Obviously, different people deal with things
n different ways, but I'm interested in how you deal with them. Each item says something about a
>articular way of coping. I want to know to what extent you usually do what the item says. How
nuch or how frequently. Don't answer on the basis of whether it seems to work or not - just
vhether you do it. Please tick in the box that describes you best. Make your answers as true for
'ou as you can.
In general how often do you do each of the following: Not at all A little bit A medium
amount
A lot
1. I turn to work or other activities to take my mind
off things
2. I concentrate my efforts on doing something about
the situation I'm in
3. 1 say to myself "this isn't real"
4. I use alcohol or other drugs to make myself feel
better
5. 1 get emotional support from others
6. I give up trying to deal with it
7. 1 take action to try to make the situation better
8. I refuse to believe it has happened
9. I say things to let my unpleasant feelings escape
10. I get help and advice from other people
11.1 use alcohol or other drugs to help me get through
it
12. I try to see it in a different light, to make it seem
more positive
Karen Livingstone 153 D.Clin.Psychol




14. 1 try to come up with a strategy about what to do
15. 1 get comfort and understanding from someone
16. I give up the attempt to cope
17. I look for something good in what is happening
18. I make jokes about it
19. 1 do something to think about it less, such as
going to the movies, watching, TV, reading,
daydreaming, sleeping or shopping
20. I accept the reality of the fact it has happened
21.1 express my negative feelings
22. I try to find comfort in my religion or spiritual
beliefs
23. I try to get advice or help from other people about
what to do
24. I learn to live with it
25. I think hard about what steps to take
26. I blame myself for things that happened
27. I pray or meditate
28. I make fun of the situation
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Appendix 7
Table A.l. Exploratory data analyses
Variable Group Mean (SD) Skewness Kurtosis
Age Psychosis 39.27(11.30) 0.547 -0.347
AMD 40.52 (10.67) -0.325 -0.349




Psychosis 24.19(8.64) -0.253 -1.024
AMD 24.19(9.18) 0.081 -0.744




Psychosis 16.81 (5.76) -0.402 -0.570
AMD 16.33 (4.83) -0.582 0.797




Psychosis 14.95 (2.64) 1.179 1.18
AMD 15.05 (3.35) 0.280 0.620




Psychosis 13.05 (2.42) 0.830 2.423
AMD 13.67 (2.94) -0.696 0.781




Psychosis 6.76(1.58) 0.771 -0.217
AMD 7.71 (2.00) 0.188 -0.685




Psychosis 15.48 (2.66) 0.312 0.607
AMD 16.81 (4.93) 0.706 -0.298




Psychosis 12.24 (4.55) 0.315 -0.581
AMD 12.95 (4.75) 0.336 -0.949




Psychosis 12.10(5.47) 0.063 -1.382
AMD 12.62 (6.52) 0.885 0.503




Psychosis 9.67 (5.40) 0.614 -0.925
AMD 11.05 (6.37) 0.622 0.230




Psychosis 17.52 (4.80) 0.346 -0.151
AMD 18.76 (5.14) 0.164 -0.495




Psychosis 11.90 (5.23) -0.153 -1.157
AMD 14.43 (5.63) 0.020 -0.899




Psychosis 63.90(15.15) 0.277 -1.091
AMD 69.76 (14.53) 0.671 0.689
Healthy Vol 55.38 (13.95) 1.731 3.508
Note. Standard Error of Skewness = 0.501; Standard Error of Kurtosis = 0.972; ERQ =
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; ERQ-2 = Emotion Regulation Questoinnaire-2; BES =
Basic Emotion Scale; SD = Standard Deviation; AMD = Anxiety/Mood Disorder group.
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Table A.l. Exploratory data analyses (continued)
Variable Group Mean (SD) Skewness Kurtosis
BES Psychosis 15.00 (5.03) 0.386 -0.543
General AMD 14.90 (5.02) 0.225 -0.811
Anger Healthy Vol 12.33 (4.52) 1.113 1.628
BES Psychosis 15.86 (5.83) -0.073 -0.551
General AMD 16.10(6.30) 0.124 -0.381
Sadness Healthy Vol 7.33 (4.25) 1.502 1.294
BES Psychosis 11.38 (6.48) 0.996 0.190
General AMD 12.76 (6.28) 0.802 0.256
Disgust Healthy Vol 7.00 (2.51) 1.573 4.159
BES Psychosis 20.57 (4.35) -0.181 -0.957
General AMD 21.29 (4.01) -0.016 -0.432
Fear Healthy Vol 13.00 (4.18) 0.693 1.017
BES Psychosis 13.00 (4.44) -0.432 0.043
General AMD 15.10(5.53) 0.620 0.868
Happiness Healthy Vol 20.62 (3.61) -0.735 0.064
BES Psychosis 75.33 (18.06) 1.090 0.072
General AMD 80.62(12.15) -0.007 -0.611
Overall Healthy Vol 60.33 (14.26) 1.191 1.599
BriefCOPE Psychosis 5.81 (1.37) -0.013 -0.364
SelfDistraction AMD 6.14(1.53) -0.731 -0.119
Healthy Vol 5.76(1.45) 0.131 -1.291
BriefCOPE Psychosis 4.86(1.71) 0.509 -0.625
Active Coping AMD 4.86(1.46) 0.379 -0.081
Healthy Vol 6.43 (1.25) -0.418 -0.468
Brief COPE Psychosis 4.00(1.58) 1.007 0.922
Denial AMD 3.20(1.65) 1.273 0.741
Healthy Vol 2.62(1.12) 3.239 12.559
BriefCOPE Psychosis 3.24(1.34) 1.041 1.416
Substance Use AMD 3.62 (2.04) 1.400 1.075
Healthy Vol 2.86(1.11) 0.795 -0.950
Brief COPE Psychosis 5.57 (1.83) -0.153 -0.829
Emotional AMD 5.71 (1.45) 0.445 -1.100
Support Healthy Vol 5.52(1.37) -0.186 -0.976
Brief COPE Psychosis 5.57(1.40) -0.344 -0.653
Instrumental AMD 5.33 (1.65) 0.582 -1.078
Support Healthy Vol 5.67(1.39) -0.073 -0.722
Brief COPE Psychosis 4.19(1.17) 0.219 -0.696
Behavioural AMD 5.00 (2.09) 0.108 -1.234
Disengagement Healthy Vol 2.33 (0.79) 2.583 6.408
Brief COPE Psychosis 4.38 (1.16) -0.635 -0.033
Venting AMD 4.29(1.62) 0.663 -0.126
Healthy Vol 4.33 (1.43) 0.487 0.895
Note. Standard Error of Skewness = 0.501; Standard Error of Kurtosis = 0.972; BES = Basic
Emotion Scale; SD = Standard Deviation; AMD = Anxiety/Mood Disorder group.
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Table A.l. Exploratory data analyses (continued)




Psychosis 3.90(1.51) 0.655 -0.739
AMD 4.81 (1.37) 0.510 -0.007
Healthy Vol 5.38 (1.02) 0.665 0.779
BriefCOPE
Planning
Psychosis 5.14(1.35) -0.419 -0.454
AMD 5.67(1.24) -0.860 0.194
Healthy Vol 6.00(1.05) 0.000 0.399
BriefCOPE
Humour
Psychosis 4.67 (2.03) 0.266 -0.996
AMD 4.19(2.11) 0.533 -1.021
Healthy Vol 4.71 (1.65) 0.136 -0.155
Brief COPE
Acceptance
Psychosis 6.05 (1.36) 0.038 -1.131
AMD 6.48 (1.69) -1.461 1.628
Healthy Vol 6.05 (0.65) -0.727 0.699
BriefCOPE
Religion
Psychosis 3.81 (2.14) 0.750 -1.000
AMD 3.62(1.91) 0.893 -0.262
Healthy Vol 3.10(1.99) 1.727 1.856
BriefCOPE
Self-Blame
Psychosis 6.38 (1.36) -0.779 0.554
AMD 6.62(1.77) -1.196 0.626
Healthy Vol 4.38 (1.43) 0.944 0.996
BriefCOPE
Adaptive
Psychosis 39.57 (8.06) 0.284 -0.562
AMD 40.67 (7.07) 0.120 -1.598
Healthy Vol 43.33 (6.38) 0.458 0.439
BriefCOPE
Maladaptive
Psychosis 28.00 (3.39) 0.493 0.029
AMD 28.95 (4.88) 0.234 -0.613




Psychosis 15.57(3.36) 0.141 -1.059
AMD 15.86 (2.90) 0.915 0.093




Psychosis 13.86 (3.26) 0.007 -1.028
AMD 14.81 (2.62) 0.469 -0.691
Healthy Vol 15.24 (2.99) -0.008 -0.618
Note. Standard Error of Skewness = 0.501; Standard Error of Kurtosis = 0.972; SD =
Standard Deviation; AMD - Anxiety/Mood Disorder group.
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